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Preface

“Why study I-raq… isn’t I-raq just sand and war?” an American friend asked.
I must say I was thrilled by the question. My friend had simply forgotten that we were having this
conversation in Cairo and only a few weeks ago in her imagination, Egypt was just camels and
pyramids. For my friend, Cairo was now a familiar place but Iraq was a distant land of sand and
war. If anything, my friend’s honest question reveals how we construct the “other” in our minds,
but more importantly how fluid and constantly changing this construction of the other is. Many
years ago, European powers divided their colonial subjects into three main zones – the Near,
Middle and Far East. I grew up learning that the second of these, the Middle-East, where I was
born (told I was) and lived most of my life, is the source of the world’s troubles. My interest to
study this conflict-prone region grew, but so did my confusion every time I realized that the
definition and geographic location of the Middle-East was constantly changing. It is for that reason
that I hope to encourage my reader to challenge the absolutes and question stereotypes about the
Middle-East. This research is a very humble attempt to show a reality about the “other” that may
not often appear in the newspaper or in television.
I must also say that my plan to do fieldwork and study “the other” was only half the
equation. I ended up also studying myself. Being in the field and facing all kinds of physical,
environmental and emotional stressors meant that I was at times observing myself like I was
watching a film in the theatre. I began to question my own identity; as a Christian I thought I would
be welcomed by other Christians but more often than not I was excluded because I was not Catholic
and did not speak Aramaic. As an Egyptian, I was not welcomed by many Egyptians because I did
not fit their notion of a “typical” Egyptian female. At times I felt confused about the role I should
5

take or the role that the participants expected or wanted me to take. I was functioning both as a
researcher and a volunteer and with that came the expectation that I was also a counsellor, but I
was also there just as a human-being.
At first those roles and the expectations that came with them were restricting and isolating,
but as I began to develop rapport with the women I began not only to gain more knowledge or
information but depth, and with that came the issue of emotional labour. Emotional labour is a
topic that is often sidetracked and ignored once the research is published and the feeling of
achievement prevails. For me, the issue of emotional labour was a present reality that I cannot hide
or run away from; it continues to resurface every time I revisit the material. The memory of a
father carrying his daughter after trying to commit suicide for the fifth time, a mother receiving
news that her son drowned as an illegal migrant in an attempt to reach fortress Europe, stories of
missing children, lost love, and rape that left the victim alive but dead. Most of the time I did not
even have an immediate reaction given the intensity of the accounts, but for days, weeks, even
now as I write, I’m visited by feelings of helplessness, powerlessness, and grieve … I had turned
into a wounded researcher!
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Introduction
My research centers on the experiences of five Yezidi female refugees in Kurdistan
and how they survived the ISIS siege of their hometown- Sinjar. Yezidis, an ethno-religious
community living in northern Iraq were the center of most news stories for the massacres they
faced under ISIS and the sex-enslavement of thousands of them. This research attempts to show
how a large-scale event like genocide impacts the life of the individual on the micro-level, but also
how individual narratives are instrumental in constructing a collective identity, presenting Yezidis
as a historically persecuted group. By examining sectarian relations in Iraq before and after the
American invasion of 2003, the research situates the Yezidi genocide within the context of
sectarian politics in the nation-state. Personal narratives are used as the main methodology to
portray how each woman uniquely experienced and remembers the fall of Sinjar, the survival phase
and how she lives as a refugee in the aftermath. The impact that trauma has on memory is an
important element of the personal narratives but also speak of the collective Yezidi experience.
Structure of the Thesis:
The chapters of this research can be seen as a journey taking the reader through different
dimensions of the story of the Yezidi genocide. In the introduction I present my own experience
in doing the fieldwork in 2016, two years after the genocide. Through my experience I highlight
several factors that may be relevant to researchers doing fieldwork in Iraq like language, safety
and encountering the other while also being encountered as the other. Chapter one examines the
Yezidi genocide within the larger debate over the conceptual and legal definition of the crime of
Genocide. It also provides background on Yezidis, the victims of this genocide as well as political
and historical factors that led to the rise of the perpetrators –ISIS by examining sectarian relations
10

within the state of Iraq before and after the American invasion of 2003. The way in which sexual
violence has become characteristic of the Islamic state but also inherently overlaps with war in a
universal sense is also examined. Chapter two covers the methodology by looking at narrative
theory and how narrative was used as the main methodology in this research and how it serves as
a tool for the survivor to articulate and make sense of their world. Chapter three presents the five
main interlocutors paving the way to Chapter four which focuses on the accounts given by those
women on the siege and fall of Sinjar. Chapter five is a continuation of the narratives focusing on
how each woman survived; those who were captured, those who hid in the mountain and those
who remained and eventually managed to escape. The final chapter is an Epilogue, examining the
refugee problem both in terms of security and the representation of the traumatized victim. This
chapter also sheds light on several aspects of recovery and how the women do life in the aftermath
of the events, both on the individual level and at the level of the community.
Doing the Fieldwork
The main concern that is usually raised when discussing research in volatile places like
Iraq is the issue of safety. To begin with it is important to differentiate Kurdistan or Northern Iraq
from the rest of Iraq. From my experience having visited Kurdistan twice, once in Erbil and once
in Dohuk, this place has generally been very safe. Despite the proximity of cities that were still
under the control of ISIS, Dohuk was very a very safe city particularly in the day in day out. There
is no harassment, women can walk alone at night and transportation is very safe.
Accessibility is another important factor because sometimes conflict zones are imagined
as places out of reach. Travelling to Kurdistan is as easy as going to any part of the world. There
are direct flights from Frankfurt, Cairo, Amman and Istanbul to Erbil. Dohuk is a three-hour drive
from Erbil airport which means that transportation is needed to reach Dohuk. Erbil however was
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completely different from Dohuk, where most of the refugee camps are located. Erbil was a city
with sky scrapers, gated compounds, huge malls, extremely extravagant restaurants and
International schools. There were people from all over the world; Mexicans, Dutch, Americans,
Koreans, Scottish, Danish and Indians.
Language was one of the areas where I had experienced some difficulty. The majority of
Kurds speak Arabic fluently so I did not have an issue in the daily encounters with the Kurdish
population but language was a barrier when doing the fieldwork. Many of the Yezidi women I met
were originally village inhabitants and therefore some did not go to school or did not need to
master Arabic in the same way that city dwellers would. Another important factor was that many
women simply refused to speak Arabic after the events of 2014. Many times, at the start of a
conversation, a respondent would express her inability to speak Arabic but half way through the
conversation when she felt more comfortable, she would switch to Arabic. It is worth mentioning
that Yezidism is not just a religion but it is an ethnoreligious identity. For many Yezidis, preserving
the language of their ethnic community was a vital component of resistance because Arabic was
now the language of the enemy. There was also another legitimate reason for their refusal of
Arabic; it was the simple fact that many of them are traumatized. Many of those girls were raped
and humiliated by Arab speaking ISIS militants; the idea of hearing the same language again with
its various dialects stimulated the trauma once again.
What was particularly interesting is that while I was welcomed at every occasion for being
a Christian, be it by Kurds or Yezidis, this was not always the case with other Christians in
Bekhitmy- the village where I was staying. Bikhetmy was a modest village in Dohuk with a
predominantly Christian population with exception of a few Shiite families. For my Christian
neighbors, it was a shame that I could not speak their “Christian Language” which is the Syriac
12

dialect of Aramic– an ancient language that is still used by some Christian communities is
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. It was a greater shame that I was not a Catholic. To my luck, they were
fond of Egyptians for refusing the government of the Muslim Brotherhood and they all expressed
their admiration of Egyptian cinema particularly the famous actor, Adel Imam.
The time I spent with the neighbors was of great value and their stories were deeply
enriching. Each of the neighbors had moved to Dohuk at a certain point in time due to war or
persecution. There were those who served in the war on Iran, there were those who moved because
they had encountered religious persecution under Saddam and there were those who longed for the
days when Saddam was president. It was interesting to note that despite this being a predominantly
Christian, the political views I heard were as diverse as Iraq’s sects but there was unanimous
agreement even among the elderly who have served in wars that there was nothing worse than
ISIS.
Challenges
The biggest challenge I faced was getting the necessary connections to do the fieldwork.
My initial plan was to interview female survivors who have experienced sexual assault only.
Accordingly, I was trying to establish connections with local and International human-trafficking
NGOs. Things seemed to be working well when I was in Cairo but as soon as I arrived all the plans
had changed. I received several apologies from various NGOs. Many of the girls who were at first
willing to share their stories changed their minds. They were getting tired of media intrusion and
strangers coming to see what it was like to be Yezidi and to be raped. I was told that I should have
come earlier, Yezidis were much more willing to open up and share their stories but now they were
just tired. If anything, those failed attempts were indicative of some important truths.Yezidis are
in essence a very secretive and conservative group and being subject to public opinion and constant
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intrusion from strangers is in many ways foreign to their nature. The second important truth was
an indication of the emotional state the girls were in. Two years after the siege, the urge to speak
and the exhilaration of being rescued or having escaped was now gone and they were now faced
with the terrible routine of life, which made it difficult for them to revisit those closed chapters. I
had to refigure out ways to do this and this involved expanding my research to examine how
different women and not just enslaved women experienced the siege.
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Chapter 1
Using the “G” word
2 August, 2014, the day before ISIS captures Sinjar was a public holiday celebrating the
end of a fasting season named in honor of Sheikh Adi. Families gathered with their relatives to
celebrate the feast by slaughtering sheep and handing out sweets. It was common in the past to
find Muslim neighbors join their Yezidi neighbors in such celebrations but in the last couple of
years this was no longer the scene. At around dusk, unfamiliar vehicles began to appear and rumors
were spreading about ISIS militants taking the city over. Those rumors however, soon turned out
to be facts (Otten, 2017). Around 6,383 Yezidis, the majority of whom were women and children
were held as captives, and later transported to prisons, military training camps, and the homes of
ISIS militants across eastern Syria and western Iraq where they were raped, tortured and trafficked
into slave markets. By 2016, 2,590 women and children managed to escape or were bought by
smugglers but 3,793 remain in captivity. At least 3 thousand Yezidis were killed, many more
executed, and the rest were left to die in the mountain as a result of injuries, starvation and
dehydration (Otten, 2017).
Throughout this work, the term I consciously and consistently use to refer to the Yezidi
atrocity is Genocide. Despite this being the chosen framework through which Yezidis choose to
remember the traumatic event of 3, August, 2014, and the International community led by the U.S
secretary of State, John Kerry acknowledged that ISIS is a genocidal group, it remains important
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to note that using a term like genocide is not as straightforward as it appears to be and has created
much controversy.
To begin with, how do we know that Genocide is happening? The answer to that is simply
because we are told it is (Mamdani, 2009). The reason why one term may be used to refer to one
atrocity and not the other, why one place is labelled Genocide, and another place war or insurgency
has do with what Mamdani calls “the politics of naming” (Mamdani, 2007). Writing in 2007, the
writer notes that while the conflict in Congo, which has been the most lethal conflict since WWII,
received little attention from the United States, thousands of Americans rallied against the
“genocide” in Darfur for the mere fact that in the former Congo militia were U.S trained, while in
the latter, the perpetrators are known to be Arabs killing African victims. More so, why is it that
the conflict in Darfur was labelled genocide while the U.S invasion of Iraq, both happening at the
same time, was labelled as insurgency or counter-insurgency (Mamdani, 2007)?
The Politics of Naming
Understanding the politics of naming is particularly substantial when it comes to the Yezidi
situation. This does not mean that what happened to Yezidis in 2014 is anything less than genocide
or to undermine the magnitude of the atrocity but it is rather to shed light to political factors that
must be examined when using terms like Genocide. Once we hear that Genocide is happening
somewhere, our minds automatically associate this with examples we have seen elsewhere; the
holocaust, Rwanda, Cambodia and Bosnia just to name a few, are all examples that our minds
replay as soon as the word Genocide is mentioned. In our consciousness this turns into a
confrontation between good and evil, and a need for a savior is awakened, but the conflict in Iraq
shows us that the situation is much more complex. The role that the U.S plays in being the “savior”
of minorities targeted by the evil genocidaires-ISIS deserves much scrutiny. A curious examination
16

of Iraqi politics shows that the ISIS crisis cannot be treated in isolation of the long history of U.S
involvement in Iraq since 2003 and the heightened sectarian divisions that resulted. The U.S
strategy following the occupation was based on the deliberate balkanization of the state much like
the military intervention in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan (Shihade, 2009). This was first achieved
through ‘de-Bathifying’ the nation leading to anarchy, followed by the active entrenchment of
sectarian politics and the empowerment of certain communities over the others. This did not only
result in destroying the delicate social fabrics of society, but more destructively, led to the rise of
extremism which climaxed into genocide.
One must also question the effectiveness of the conceptual and legal framework in
preventing the crime of Genocide from happening. For Raphael Lemkin, hunting for a term that
could confront the crime and express the vandalism committed by Hitler against the Jews was
essential to prevent the crime from happening but it was only the first step. Combining the Greek
derivative geno, meaning “race” and the latin derivative cide which means “killing”, Lemkin
coined the word Genocide to name the crime without name (Lemkin, 1944). Despite it gaining
worldwide popularity and its immediate integration into the dictionary, naming the crime was not
enough to stop it from happening; law had to step in (Power, 2002). It would take several years
for Lemkin to develop a legal framework to criminalize genocide. In 1948 the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined genocide as any of the following act
committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group,
as such:
A) Killing members of the group;
B) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
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C) Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
D) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
E) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
In reality however, the Genocide convention achieved little. Not only are there limitations
with the convention in terms of how “the intent” to kill or destroy can be identified and defined or
in its inability to address protection of people who may be persecuted for political and economic
reasons and not just religious or ethnic reasons, but more importantly the convention achieved
little in practice. It took the U.S forty years to ratify the Genocide convention and it took fifty years
for the International community to convict anyone of genocide, even the countries that did ratify
the convention never invoked it to punish Genocide (Power, 2002). In her timeless work, “A
Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power (2002) takes her reader
through every major genocide and in every case, the writer contends that time and again the
International Community led by the United States, despite having enough evidence, have failed to
respond. The end result is that we have all been bystanders to genocide (Power, 2002). I would
argue however, that in some cases the International community did take action but in the wrong
way. This was clear in Cambodia when the United States chose to side with a genocidal state
killing its people over Vietnam a country hostile to the United States. Then again, in backing
Saddam Hussein’s regime while he exterminated the Kurds and in Bosnia where the Clinton
administration shifted language over the course of the conflict from that of Genocide to civil war
because saving Bosnian lives was not deemed worth risking American soldiers and because
America did not want to upset its European allies who wanted to remain neutral (Power, 2002). In
all those examples, the International community could not acknowledge or prevent genocide from
18

happening despite the presence of a legal and conceptual framework. It took two years for the U.N
to recognize the ISIS’s campaign as genocide and even then it was described as “ongoing”, despite
the presence of a Genocide Convention (Dearden, 2017).
This problematization of the word genocide should not be taken as a green light to abandon
the conceptual and legal framework. We cannot criticize the U.S for using double-standards to
serve American interest if we did not have a set of guidelines that tell us what genocide is and what
it is not. Instead, they should be the entry point to ask questions of why they are applied in certain
areas and not others, who has the power to name and how does it conform or contradict with the
agenda of western super powers. These questions help unearth the heart of the conflict rather than
beguile us into a simple binary scheme of saviors and survivors.
In the case of Yezidis, the concept of genocide is even more problematic. One must
be careful in making a case that ISIS is a genocidal group and not just a terrorist group committing
acts against humanity because genocide has often been linked to the nation state attempting to kill
a specific group of people based on their identity be it ethnic or religious (Whiteside, 2015).
Historical examples beginning with the Armenian genocide, the Jewish Holocaust or the Rwandan
genocide were all performed by state-actors towards their populations. Before making a case for
genocide, it is necessary to provide a background on the victims and the perpetrators of this conflict
and how sectarian relations evolved within the state of Iraq.

Who are the Yezidis?
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Yezidis are an ethnoreligious community; the majority has lived in Jabal Sinjar, a
mountainous area rising in the upper northern Jazira plateau, ninety kilometers southwest of
Mosul. Other Yazidis inhabited the Shaikhan district, located between the Mosul plain and the
Kurdish mountains, and in the Kurdish districts of Zakhu and Dohuk(Fuccaro,1997). Yezidis of
Iraq are Kurdish in ethnicity but speak a Kurdish dialect known as Krumanji (Hanish, 2009).
Northern Iraq has always been considered the homeland of Yazidis since the 12th century, when
Yezidism started to revive among Kurdish population.
The Yezidi religious revival was led by 'Adi ibn Musafir (ca. 1075-1162), an Arab Sufi
shaykh whom the Yezidis consider the saintly founder or, according to a different tradition, the
reviver of their religion (Fuccaro,1997).The idiosyncrasies of Yezidism are not only limited to the
integration of various elements from different religions be it Sufism, Shi'ite sects, pre-Islamic
beliefs , Sunnism or Christianity, the uniqueness of Yezidism lies in it being both a religion and
an ethnic identity , which define the belonging of its followers to the Ezdik-hana. Yezidism is
known to be a secretive religion; outsiders are provided with minimal and superficial information
about the theology and practices of the religion. The senjaqs, which are images of a peacock
symbolising Malak Tawus, are a perfect example of this mysteriousness, very few non-Yezidis
have ever seen any of these images, and least of all the one kept secretly in Armenia (Nicolaus,
2011). Similarly, the symbolism of the black snake remains mysterious and inaccessible to nonYezidis. The reason for such mysteriousness could easily be attributed to the fact that for centuries
Yezidis have suffered several persecutions. In response to the constant perceived threat, Yezidis
developed the practice of hiding certain mythological concepts from non-Yezidis as a way of
protecting themselves. But given their minority status, concealing such information which may be
sensitive or offensive to the feelings of their neighbors is an “accommodative approach” to help
20

them survive and become more accepted by the other. Yezidis attempt to find common language
with their neighbors to create a tolerant environment, rather than on stubbornly insisting on strange
dogmas and beliefs that may repulse others (Nicolaus, 2011).
One explanation of the sacredness of the black serpent is that the serpent played a role in
their flood myth by helping save Noah’s ark as recited in the Mash’afā-ṝaš, (“Black Book”, or
more correctly “Black Writing”) (Nicolaus, 2011), which is why every Yezidi must keep a symbol
of the serpent as a reminder of its religious significance. The Peacock Angel, Malak-Tawus is a
central figure in the Yezidi faith, as all divine functions were transferred by God,Khawade to
Malak-Tawus and he is regarded as the source of origin of all Yezidis. This is why Yezidis call
themselves milate Malak-Tawus, or “people of Malak Tawus”. The wide belief that Yezidis
worship the devil rises from the fact that the word Say’an which refers to the peacock angel literally
translates into the word Al- Shay’tan which is the Arabic for Satan (Hanish, 2009). They are the
most oppressed religion in Iraq because their religion and beliefs are misunderstood by Muslims
as devil-worshippers and they are not considered “People of the Book” as Christians and Jews are
(Hanish, 2009).
The epicenter of Yezidism is in the city of Lalish, not far from the city of Dohuk. Lalish
Consists of a collection of temples constructed around the tomb of the Sufi Mystic Sheikh Adi ibn
Musafir, Every Yezidi ought to make a pilgrimage to Lalish at least once in his or her lifetime
(Otten, 2017). Yezidis believe that the universe was created by God from a pearl that split on his
command and gave out light and water. He created seven angels who were put in charge of making
the earth, and Lalish was the start.
Although most Yezidis were sedentary and semi-nomadic agriculturalists and cattle
breeders, the community played a significant role in the development of ethnic politics in northern
21

Iraq. They form the second-largest non-Muslim community and the largest heterodox Kurdish
group settled in the Mosul province. Their geographic location, being settled in the border with
Syria and Turkey was of great significance to the Iraqi state since 1918, because controlling this
area became strategically vital to safe guard its position in the new regional order created by the
colonial powers (Fuccaro, 1997). Until the late 1930s, Yezidi Kurds of Jabal Sinjar continued to
be a pre-national community, and despite the fact that there were different tribal affiliations within
the Yezidi community, group solidarity mainly depended on primordial ties of ethnicity and
religion.
Their contiguous settlement within the boundaries of mount Sinjar reinforced their
distinctiveness as an ethnoreligious group among a predominantly Sunni region and acted as a
powerful catalyst for group mobilization in times of conflict against the other. Although, Yezidis
shared many social and culture ties with their Sunni counterparts living in southern Kurdistan, yet
contact between those two Kurdish communities was scarce and tension between Yezidis and their
Muslim neighbors has deep historic roots (Fuccaro, 1997). Under Ottoman administration, Yezidis
were subject to religious discrimination and many were forced to convert to Islam. This created
deep resentment between Yezidis who were refusing to be ruled by a leader who is not a member
of the community and Sunni Kurds and Arabs (Fuccaro, 1997). This resentment would translate
into an issue of state security when Syria which was governed by the French raised claims that the
western part of Mount Sinjar should be part of the Syrian Jazira, despite it having being
administered by the British and later Iraqi authorities since 1919. The threat grew when French
officials who were in frequent contact with Yezidi tribesmen, began to support Yezidi claims
against conscription in the Iraqi army as a way of extending their influence in the mountain. Many
Yezidis started to migrate from Iraq seeking Syrian protection. The Iraqi government has often
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depicted the French policy of resettlement of non-Arab elements particularly of Kurds and
Assyrians, as synonymous with the settlement of non-Arabs into Palestine by the Zionists
(Fuccaro, 1997).
Sectarian relations and the nation-state
While the focus of this research is on the Yezidi community, one cannot examine the Yezidi
case without looking at sectarian relations within the nation-state of Iraq as a whole. The birth of
the nation-state of Iraq led to different religious and ethnic communities being bound to the
boundaries of one governing unit. The nation-state provides us with a deep understanding of how
sectarian relations evolved in Iraq and gives context to the Yezidi genocide of 2014. The nationstate, which in essence is a modern European phenomenon, was replicated around the world
through colonialism (Shihade, 2009). The project of building a nation state had to follow a process
of imagining the nation in the first place and then creating boundaries through which people who
are imagined to be members of this nation-state would fall under. Those boundaries define who
would be included and excluded, depending on the extent to which those people fit the prototype
of the imagined nation state and can be homogenized (Shihade, 2009).
Communal and ethnic categorization were established and used by colonial powers from
the moment the nation-state of Iraq was conceived. This does not mean that there has always been
peaceful coexistence between different communities in the 500 years of Ottoman rule, after all
Sunni-Shiite animosity dates back to 680 CE (Holden, 2012) and a realistic examination if this
period reveals several incidents of religious discrimination (Holden, 2012) (David et al, 2017).
The issue however is that the framework of the nation-state rather than creating developed and
unified political entities that can live in harmony as hoped for, created structures of discrimination
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based on religion and ethnicity that have an enduring effect and in many cases still influence those
nations, long after colonial rule has ended (Shihade, 2009).
The Iraqi nation-state was born as a monarchy under British rule in 1920. With the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the British decided to unite the three Ottoman provinces of
Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, which now constitute what we know as “Iraq”. This setup meant that
the Mosul province which was mainly inhabited by Sunni Kurds, Baghdad province which was
predominantly occupied by Sunni Arabs and the Basra province occupied by Shi’ites would
become a joined entity, under a centralized government (Abdi, 2008). Each province had been
previously granted a high degree of autonomy under Ottoman rule which explains why sectarian
tension was less eminent than it would later be under the nation- state.
Adding to the complicated ethno-religious composition was the fact that the newly
established state relied significantly on Sunni Arabs to run state affairs. The British preferred to
appoint loyal Iraqis who were willing to collaborate both politically and economically with the
colonial powers and this was to be found in the Sunni Arabs who were a minority forming 20% of
the population (Sluglett, 2010). In this sense sectarian tension was the result of discriminating
colonial policies towards Shiites who formed a numerical majority. It is worth noting that despite
the common perception of deeply rooted animosity between Shi’ites and Sunnis, history reveals
that there were times of unity between the two sects; the revolt of 1920 which called for an
independent Iraqi state against British rule reveals a Sunni-Shiite unity. This unity was rather short
lived because as the Sunnis realized that the British were not going to withdraw from Iraq, they
had to quickly realign themselves again with the British (Sluglett, 2010). It is important to note
that although Iraq gained independence in 1932, Britain continued to have geostrategic interest in
Iraq and continued to orchestrate the political scene until 1958 (Bashkin, 2009).
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The radical demands of the Shiite clergy meant that their incorporation within the kind of
Iraq that the colonial powers had imagined was almost impossible, and consequently they were
secluded from any formal political representation. To justify their discriminatory policies, the
British have very often portrayed the Shiite leadership as fanatics and opposed to progress, while
the Sunnis being more cooperative were the more secular and progressive group (Sluglett, 2010).
In the case of the Kurds, the incorporation within the newly established state was an
unanticipated misfit because they regarded themselves a distinct ethnic group that should not be
part of Arab Iraq. The area of land which they have inhabit known as Kurdistan, has been known
throughout history even before the creation of the Iraqi state as “Bilad Al-Akrad” which literally
means the land of the Kurds. The Kurds right to autonomous rule had initially been planned by the
British and recognized in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 (Yildiz, 2011). Nonetheless, the plan for
Kurdish independence was altered due to disputes of who was entitled to rule the area. The British
resolved this by restoring the area which was subject to the Treaty of Sèvres to Turkish
sovereignty; and the rest of the land was divided between Iran and the new state of Iraq (Rydgren
et al, 2016). Ever since the integration of Mosul to the Iraqi state, the Kurds have continually
opposed Arab administration with five violent uprisings erupting only in the period between 19211936 (Dawisha, 2013).
Assyrians were another ethnic Christian group that had a troubling history with the
Ottomans that continued and heightened with the establishment of the state of Iraq. After World
War I, the remnants of Assyrian refugees were taken by the British to settle in Mosul, Iraq
(Zubaida, 2000). Assyrians, like the Kurds feared a centralized government but they welcomed
British rule. Being Christian, gave them a sense of privilege because of their special connection
with Christian Europe and accordingly they became servants to the British whom they regarded as
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their colonial masters. The British exploited this by forming battalions of Assyrian armed men to
protect the borders of the emerging state and then to suppress Kurdish rebellions. Their loyalty to
the British meant that the Assyrians were now facing rejection from the entire population; Arabs,
Kurds and Turkmen (Zubaida, 2000). However, this privileged relationship turned into a bloody
massacre when Assyrian claims for independence did not match the agenda of the British, and
certainly not the government in Baghdad (Zubaida, 2000). In 1933, dispute between Assyrians and
the Iraqi army supported by the British culminated in what became known as the massacre of
Simmel (Zubaida, 2000).
During this nation building project, the army had a significant role in influencing the
nationalist discourse as it became a symbol of modern nationhood. Tribal, ethnic and religious
identities were regarded as part of the backwardness of the past and the concern for minorities was
part of a colonial conspiracy that aimed at dividing Iraqi society. Within this discourse, the
nationalist project modeled on Kemalist Turkey, was a meeting point that would unite all Iraqis
towards the pursuit of secular ambition (Zubaida, 2000). This noble ambition did not often
materialize in reality, due to the pre-established power structures, the army, the symbol of Iraqi
unity, became the source of sectarian strife.
Army conscription was a source of constant sectarian tension between Yezidis who had to
redefine communal solidarities and the Iraqi nation state. The process of nation building took its
harsh course on Yezidis in 1935, enforcing universal conscription into the Iraqi army. While
conscription theoretically should have meant the integration of Yezidis as part of the nation, the
government continued to promote discriminatory policies by supporting Sunni colonization of
mount Sinjar. This led to a revolt by Yezidi tribesmen, which resulted in severe violence and the
mass migration of many Yezidis into neighboring Syria (Fuccaro, 1997).
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Remarkably, the sectarian nature of the state was not always a source of contention but has
contributed in a significant way to the development of a pluralistic public sphere, enriching
intellectual life in Iraq (Bashkin, 2009). The interactions between colonizers and colonized, as well
as a diversity of sects fused into one nation system, in a time when Iraq was awakened to a wave
of regional Arab nationalism, has as a matter of fact contributed to the hybrid nature of Iraqi culture
(Bashkin, 2009). This in turn created a shared universe of discourse in the intellectual world, where
Jewish, Christians, Sunnis and Shiite intellectual were preoccupied with the same ideas (Bashkin,
2009).
What the state failed to do during those years of nation-building was to develop a more
inclusionary rhetoric of Iraqi nationalism that could unify all Iraqis to a unique heritage of their
own. The tendency to adopt Arab nationalism was much more powerful mainly due to the fact that
the ruling elite of Iraqi society, starting with the king and his Sharifian companions were strong
advocates of Arab nationalism. In addition to this, the majority of those who controlled the
country’s politics and the army were Sunni Arab elites. The strategy that this ruling minority took
was to mold all the different sects of Iraq into a broader Arab project that would serve their interests
(Dawisha, 2013).

This was clear in the realm of education where a policy of systematic

Arabization of the Kurds was implemented as a way to deny Kurds of their distinctive history
(Raafat, 2016). Similarly, Iraqi History was interpreted through a purely Sunni lens giving the
Shiites a much limited and rather negative role in the history of Iraq (Dawisha, 2013).
With the rise of the Ba’ath regime, a raid of violence swept across the country. The new
regime’s strategy was to eradicate all that remained from Hashemite Iraq, which also included the
torture and killing of thousands of Iraqis (Yildiz, 2011). Shiite groups, who were tolerated in the
past, were now constantly being attacked by the Ba’ath and many of its members executed and
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detained. Many Shiite exiles moved to Iran where they received massive support and funds from
the Iranian revolutionary guards’ corps (Ismael & Fuller, 2008). This led to further discrimination
of Shiites for their association with Iran, resulting in a large uprising in 1977, when the regime
tried to prevent Shiite pilgrims from going on foot to the Shiite holy city of Karbala to visit the
holy shrine of Imam Hussein (Ismael & Fuller, 2008).
In 1979, Saddam Hussein came to power and began a more brutal campaign against Iraqi
opposition which consisted of Iraqis from all the different political currents; Islamists, Kurdish,
nationalists, leftist and Liberal (Bayati, 2011). It is worth noting that Saddam continued to promote
the legacy of primordial affiliations of the British administrative structure. The easiest way to
guarantee social stability at the lowest possible cost was to preserve what was known in colonial
circles as the “natural order” of society by forming alliances with tribal sheikhs (Bunton, 2008).
Saddam’s decision to invade Iran in September 1980 had serious implications on the
country’s Shiite community who were constantly being attacked for their religious affiliation with
Iran as well as the Kurdish opposition who had been forming alliances with the Islamic Republic
of Iran (Yildiz, 2011). The Iraqi regime sought to end the threat of a Kurdish-Iranian alliance once
for all through continuous attacks on the Kurdish regions which started in 1980 and continued until
1991.The Anfal campaign which derives its name from a Koranic verse referring to the spoils of
the holy war, was used by the Baathist military to refer to a series of raids where chemical weapons
were systematically used against the Kurds in the spring and summer of 1988 causing the death of
up to 180,000 people (Lemerchand, 2011).
The sanctions imposed by the U.N following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait also had serious
implications on sectarian relations. The declining economy caused the emigration of middle-class,
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educated Iraqis, which had a substantial effect on the rebuilding of the country in the post war era.
But it also meant that the educated class who would have most likely strove for a balanced,
cohesive society were no longer present and given the fact that the Ba’ath had made every attempt
to crush civil society during the 70s and 80s meant that people had no support to turn to in such a
time of distress except that of tribal and communal solidarities (Yousif, 2010). The Ba’ath strategy
during this period was to hamper any possible rebellion through divide and rule. Religion and
ethnicity were not the primary concern of the regime so long as they expressed their loyalty to the
regime. This meant that while the majority of the population was devastated by the sanctions, an
emerging class of nouveaux riches; Sunnis, Shiites, Arabs and Kurds with strong ties to the regime
had actually benefitted from the sanctions (Yousif, 2010).
The Yezidi community has been subject to forced deportation under Saddam Hussein,
during the economic meltdown of the sanctions era, and the breakdown of the state and security
after the US-led invasion of 2003. The process of Arabization of minorities that started during the
1970s affected Yezidis among other groups. They were forced to identify themselves as Arabs and
they could neither study their religion nor worship freely in schools. Saddam’s government
demolished 150 Yazidi villages, moving them to what the government called “modern villages”.
The targeting of Yezidis continued in the post 2003 era, where they were continually targeted by
Islamic groups. Mass killings of Yezidis climaxed during the 2007 civil war. On August 14, 2007,
over 500 Yezidis were killed in a single day during multiple coordinated truck bombs (Mullaney,
2016). Two months prior to the attacks, 25 Yezidi textile workers were shot to death by a group
of terrorists who stopped their bus and allowed the Muslims to flee but killed the rest of the Yezidis
(Hanish, 2009).
Iraq Post-2003: A womb for terrorism
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The Islamic state of Iraq (ISI) or The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) also known as
the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant did not suddenly fall from the sky, the advent of this
militant group is directly linked to the political turmoil in Iraq that started since 2003 and continued
to escalate. The strategy used by the United States was no different than what the British colonizers
did many decades before. The difference was that the U.S turned the table over the Sunni ruling
minority in favor of the Shiite majority, causing a sudden imbalance of power that could easily
erupt into violence in the absence of state apparatuses which were purposefully eradicated by the
U.S (Shihade, 2009). The ‘de-Ba’thification’ process did not only involve the removal of
Saddam’s regime or his government but it also included the abolishment of at least 29 different
Iraqi institutions; including the army, the state bureaucracy, security and intelligence apparatuses
as well as non-military institutions leaving thousands of Iraqis unemployed, the majority of which
were Sunnis (Abdulrazaq & Stanfield, 2016).
Cultural cleansing was a significant tactic of the ‘de-Bathification’ process that aimed at
eradicating any remains of the past that tied the nation together. This included the destruction of
museums, archaeological sites that were Iraq’s Mesopotamian legacy, the change in school
curriculum to pro-American rhetoric and more viciously the targeting of the intellectual literati of
the country. As early as September 2004, Two hundred of the most prominent Iraqi academics
were assassinated (Ismael & fuller, 2008).
Following the eradication of any traces of the past regime, the U.S and its allies began to
lay the foundations of a new government that would serve first and foremost the interests of the
United States. This is where sectarianism became institutionalized and politicized to
unprecedented measures. The first step that the U.S made was to create an Interim governing
council founded on the basis of ethnic and religious divisions (Ismael & fuller, 2008). Another
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significant tactic was to replace the Iraqi constitution with a pro-American document that lacked
any nationalistic content. Article 113 through 121of the new constitution promoted the merging of
regions, specifically those that were rich in oil and gas and therefore would benefit the U.S, into
mega-states by conferring constitutional autonomy to those new merges (Ismael & Fuller, 2008).
Furthermore, under the guise of waging a counterinsurgency war, sectarian militia forces were
formed from Shiite and Kurdish groups and unleashed particularly following the inauguration of
the Shiite dominated al Ja’fari government in 2005. Those paramilitary forces were formed of
special commandos and public order brigades and would later be involved in sectarian slaughter
resulting in at least five million refugees (Ismael & Fuller, 2008).
The rise of the Kurdish Peshmerga militia as the only autonomous armed forces was
extremely relevant in promoting autonomy in the Kurdish region. Those Kurdish forces that had
been previously fighting as part of the Iraqi army were to be reintegrated within the Kurdish
resistance movement once the Iraqi army was disbanded in 2003 (Lamani & Momani, 2010). With
the Peshmerga now playing a central role in the political reconstruction of Baghdad in the postSaddam era, the Kurdish authorities were simultaneously increasing their influence in the Kurdish
outskirts. In 2005, Barzani rose to power as the new president of the Kurdistan region at the time
when Talabani became the president of Iraq (Lamani & Momani, 2010). The Peshmerga were
turned into regular forces and not “militia” securing the borders of the Kurdish region and ensuring
the Kurdish region remains independent from the instability in Baghdad (Lamani & Momani,
2010).
Rather than creating a pluralistic Iraq, the elections of 2005 created deep divisions. Shiite,
Sunni and Kurdish parties, all created coalitions based on sectarian differences giving sub-national
identities political relevance (Yamao, 2012). The problem was not due to the incompatibility of
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Iraqi society with democracy but the introduction of democratic politics in the absence of strong
civil society, the weakness of the state prior to and during the democratic attempts, and the sudden
imbalance in power between Sunnis and Shiites, led to ethnic strife as sectarian identity was given
supremacy (Younis, 2011).
It is worth noting that the purpose of the ‘de-Bathification’ process was not to eradicate a
tyrannical regime but rather to erase the borders of Iraq as a once imagined community into a
disintegrated society with no national unity tying sects together. Within this ideational vacuum,
Iraqis would revert back to tribal and communal solidarities in the absence of a nationalist ideology
(Haddad, 2013). Amidst this disintegration, militant groups took advantage of sectarian divisions
to establish their rule and this forced the U.S and its allies to reconsider their position in relation
to Iraq. This was no longer a classic case of national resistance but it was now an issue of security
for the United States, as Iraq was turned into an extremely fertile soil for terrorism to flourish.
The rise of ISIS: from national resistance to jihad
It is important to note that the rise of fundamentalism did not come as a sudden bad surprise
for the Bush administration. Classified reports prepared by the National Intelligence Council had
long predicted that the invasion of Iraq would result in the rise of Political Islam in the region but
this was something that the Bush administration had completely turned a blind eye to, because the
war was going to happen for better or worse (Taras, 2006). The marginalization of Sunnis made
the rise of fundamentalist groups an inescapable reality. The hundreds of military-trained men who
were left unemployed and excluded from the political realm for their association with Ba’athism,
began to organize resistance cells against western invaders and Political Islam provided them with
the rhetoric for resistance (Taras, 2006).
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It was in this environment that Abu-Mus’ab al Zarqawi and Al-Qaida penetrated Mosul
and northern Iraq (Abdulrazaq & Stansfield, 2016). The choice of Zarqawi as the appointed leader
of Jihad in Iraq was a very strategic decision made by Al-Qaeda because he was the man capable
to achieve the long awaited dream of establishing a caliphate in the region. He was able to flee
from Tora Bora into Pakistan on foot and was able to recruit suicide bombers all across Europe,
and in deed, Zarqawi started with less than 500 men in Iraq but was able to recruit five thousand
Iraqi fighters following the U.S invasion (Gerges, 2016). It is worth stressing that Iraq before 2003
has never experienced jihadist insurgency in the same way that other Arab states like Egypt and
Algeria have. Saddam’s increased piety during the 1990s was more of a façade used to legitimize
his rule amidst a failing state in the sanctions era, but he was clearly a strict nationalist which is
why it was much more difficult for Al-Qaeda to penetrate Iraqi society prior to 2003 (Gerges,
2016). For that reason, Zarqawi and his followers were at first not welcomed by other resistance
groups in Iraq.
In time, young Iraqis who were previously concerned with national resistance were now
being recruited by organized groups with radical ideologies. Detainees who were being released
from prison and had suffered from American abuse such as that of Abu-Gharib were becoming
more purposeful and more savage in their resistance. Resistance was now a holy war which was
made viable through Al-Qaida extensive networks and resources allowing for more deliberate and
sophisticated operations (Abdulrazaq & Stansfield, 2016).
Zarqawi’s plan in Iraq was to tear the country apart by exacerbating sectarian tension; this
was done by attacking the Shiite community to actively provoke an extreme response from Shiite
militia that would in turn incite Sunni fears of an existential Shiite threat. This was achieved
through the mass bombing of the tomb of Imam’s Ali Al-Hadi and Hasan Al-Askari in Samarra in
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2006. This atrocity ignited street violence between Shiites and Sunnis leading to a “civil war” that
lasted until the US forces intervened by deploying 30,000 additional troops to Iraq to end this war
between February 2007 and 2008(Abdulrazaq & Stansfield, 2016). As part of the plan to purify
Iraq from the infidels, Yezidis also became a target for Al-Qaeda in Iraq. It was reported that in
2008 there were no Yezidis left in Mosul because they had to make a choice to either convert or
to die. Earlier in 2006 Al-Qaeda militants attacked a bus carrying 23 Yezidi men and executed
them instantly (Lamani & Momani, 2010). A year later another Al-Qaeda affiliated group
conducted the single most devastating attack since the war on Iraq, by targeting a Yezidi
community in Sinjar, killing 796 people and leaving over 1500 wounded (Whiteside, 2015).
Before Al-Zarqawi died in an American airstrike in 2006, he passed his mantle to one of
his disciples, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi, who changed the name of the organization from Al-Qaida
in Iraq (AQI) to the Islamic state of Iraq (ISI) (Gerges, 2016). His reign however, was short-lived.
In 2010, Abu Umar al-Boghdadi, and his deputy Abu Ayyub Al-Masri were both killed in an
operation led by the American and Iraqi forces. The killing of the two most senior commanders in
a single incident created a major challenge to the survival of ISI (Gerges, 2016). A new leader,
Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was appointed to lead the organization after the death of Baghdadi the first.
At that time, ISI continued to carry out terrorist attacks and kidnappings in an attempt to
reinvigorate its presence. As Fawaz Gerges contends, the revival of the group seemed like a farfetched reality but the changes that took place in the region as well as the increasing grip on power
by the government of Maliki changed the scene entirely (Gerges, 2016).
To any observer, the civil war of 2006-2007 serve as clear evidence to validate theories of
primordial hatred in Iraq and the inability of coexistence under one state. Although, the civil war
clearly created new models of reference for sectarian relations, yet the civil war was neither
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representative of sectarian relations in Iraqi society, nor was it an aberration or an exception.
Consequently, it is also neither irreversible nor unrepeatable (Haddad, 2013). An honest attempt
to examine the civil war would inevitably lead to a great deal of ambiguity, this ambiguity is
inherent to any form of group identity as modes of self-definition are constantly changing and
fluctuating (Haddad, 2013). The years following the civil war reveal a shift where Iraqis
themselves started to reject identity politics. The bombing of Samarra and the rising death toll
during those years of civil strife have in fact created a negative disposition towards sectarianism
and prompted anti-sectarian and anti-federalist sentiments to rise as Iraqis feared the dissolution
of the state (Haddad, 2013). In the 2009 elections, 79 percent of voters expressed that reconciliation
was needed (Yamao, 2012). By 2010 there were actually no hopes for ISIS to succeed as Sunni
Arab tribes formed a coalition which became known as the Sahwa, the Sunni Awakening councils
were now siding with American troops to help end the threat posed by ISI (Gerges, 2016). This
alignment of Sunnis with the Americans provided a golden opportunity for the government to
reunite sects who were all facing the same enemy. The government’s failure to acknowledge the
demands of the Awakening councils and the continued marginalization of Sunnis resulted in the
reorganization of Sunni extremist groups against the government, reviving ISI to gain greater
control with thousands of supporters (Gerges, 2016).
The Arab Revolutions of 2011
The brutal response of the Syrian state during the popular uprising in 2011 was
significantly instrumental in the revival of ISIS. The rampant chaos in Syria in particular provided
a golden opportunity to revive ISIS as the group would now cross borders to join Syrian resistance
where there were now new recruits and joining of forces in a war zone where looting of weapons
was made easy (Gerges, 2016).
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However, the uprising in Syria alone would not have caused the reinvigoration of ISIS in
Iraq had the Sunni tribes continued in the same position in their resistance to ISIS. Several internal
factors have caused deterioration in the relationship between the government and the Sunni
population contributing to the alignment of many Sunnis with ISIS against the Shi’ led government
(Gerges, 2016). Of all the factors fueling the insurgence of ISIS, the failure of the coalition forces
and the government to rebuild the country on the foundations of an inclusive national project is by
far the most crucial. Malki’s government turned to be a replication of Saddam’s authoritarianism
and corruption; furthering political factionalism (Gerges, 2016). He monopolized power by
surrounding himself with submissive loyalists and filled security forces with political appointees
who have weakened the structure of the military making it easier for ISIS to penetrate. As a counter
force to the Sunni Sahwa council, Maliki created a parallel Shi’ia militia because he was extremely
fearful of the presence of a large Sunni armed militia with a strong popular base and receiving
endless support from the United States (Gerges, 2016). Once the U.S troops withdrew from Iraq,
the Sahwa who were promised integration into the Iraqi army for their prominent success in
fighting ISIS, ended up being arrested and accused of having ties to Ba’athists and jihadists
(Gerges, 2016). Even local Sunnis who were integrated with state institutions were given low-paid
and low-ranking jobs in comparison to Shi’is.This meant that Sunni Iraqis were now facing
opposition from both ISIS and the Shiite led government (Gerges, 2016).
By 2011, Iraqi citizens were all suffering from the government’s authoritarianism,
lack of services and the increasing corruption and cronyism. The government had failed at
fulfilling any promises, even the reconciliation initiative that was launched by the government to
fight sectarianism, and revise the ‘de-Bathification’ program failed (Gerges, 2016). Thus, when
the Arab uprisings took place, thousands of Iraqis mobilized themselves to express their discontent
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with the government (Gerges, 2016). The government repression grew, banning media coverage
of the protests and their determination to end the protests were to be achieved through violence
and human rights abuses, Protesters began to call for Maliki’s resignation and as the situation
worsened a plethora of armed groups were formed. During this time ISIS had already started to
form coalition with Sunni tribes in rural areas and they were able to attract many high ranking
former Baath officials who found a new mode of resistance through jihadism (Gerges, 2016).
As protests in Syria escalated during 2011-2013 turning Syria into a war zone, ISIS would
benefit from the Syrian chaos by recruiting plenty of supporters many of them coming from Iraq
to broaden its influence. The chaos in Syria was extremely strategic because it gave the
organization depths and maneuverability, which was essential in creating a strong base for the
expansion of the caliphate. Maliki’s support for Bashar Al Asad’s regime was the final trigger in
strengthening hostility, turning the protests into a sectarian clash between Sunnis and Shi’ites. ISIS
took advantage of this launching the “Breaking the Walls” operation, a yearlong campaign
carrying a sectarian overtone. The operation ended in July, 2013 with the triumphant breaching of
the Abu-Gharib prison causing the escape of at least 500 or more prisoners the majority of which
were detained for carrying out terrorist attacks (Gerges, 2016).
The Genocidal Ideology of ISIS
The ideology of ISIS as a movement was wholly shaped by Musab Al-Zarqawi who
adopted the Qutbian requirement of Sharia law as the basis of government. Accordingly,
secularism and democracy are antithetical to this ideology (Gerges, 2016). Zarqawi believed in
Jihad against local apostate governments and the purification of the caliphate from non-believers
who don’t follow the Sunna (Whiteside, 2015). This approach was a clear drift from Bin Laden’s
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who believed in uniting Muslims against the distant enemy, namely the United States. For Zarqawi
the fight was internal and had to start by cleansing the Umma from within (Gerges, 2016).
The organization is rooted in the politics of sectarianism, as a group it feeds on the SunniShi’i divide between the Sunni Arab world and its rival Iran (Gerges, 2016). For Zarqawi and his
successors, the Shia had long been a fifth column deviating from true Islam and their worship of
deceased Imams was against Islamic belief in one God. Their support for the infidel Americans in
the war on Iraq, and their rise to power which came at the expense of Sunnis, was the main
justification of why they had to be targeted (Whiteside, 2015). The Yezidis stood in an even more
despised position, although they did not hold any power at the state level but being labelled as
devil-worshippers meant that their elimination from the caliphate was unquestionable. Three main
works have influenced the rhetoric of ISIS justifying their acts, the most famous of which is The
Management of Slavery which strategizes a roadmap for the creation of the caliphate. The second
book is The Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Jihad, which calls for Jihadists to do what it takes
to establish a purified caliphate. The third book is The Essentials of Making Ready (for Jihad)
which focuses on theological and practical aspects of Jihad and has acted as a manual for Jihadis
in the training camps (Gerges, 2016).
To handle the number of enslaved girls and the growing market, ISIS created a special
department to manage the spoils of war (Gerges, 2016). Systematic rape has become an effective
tool to recruit men from conservative Islamic societies where casual sex is forbidden (Gerges,
2016). Fighters had both the choice to take those women as their legal wives and gain an even
greater reward of creating families from heretic Yezidi women or they were to take these women
as a source of immediate satisfaction in return for the military activities. Laws related to the
treatment of prisoners and slaves during the time of the prophet were to be implemented
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legitimizing the rape of Yezidis (Gerges, 2016). Once captured, the state was to receive one fifth
of those women as the spoils of war that must go to the Islamic state and the rest of the women
and children were to be divided between militants who participated in the operations (Gerges,
2016).
Sex, war and Islam
It could well be argued that the most horrendous of all crimes committed by ISIS pertain
to the slavery of Yezidi women. Thousands of news stories have time and again reported on Yezidi
females who were sold in “Souk al-Sabaya” reviving the political memory of the historical
Abbasids where the “Jariya” system was very central to the caliphate. The Abbasid Empire is
recognized by scholars of Muslim women’s history as the period of “Jawary”, characterized by the
capture and enslavement of women during Muslim conquests (Seedat, 2016). This political
memory is important for ISIS’ war propaganda, because it gives the organization a reputation
comparable to that of the Abbasid Empire which serves in reviving the dream of glorious caliphate.
On the other side, it has given a representation of Islam as a sensual, carnal religion that feeds on
both sex and violence. Is it Islam to blame or is it the doctrine of ISIS or is this just the rhetoric
of war in a gendered world? Sexual violence towards women is certainly not a new phenomenon;
it is rather as ancient as the practice of war but the sexual aspect of the Islamic State does present
a unique case that should be examined on its own.
Statistics on sexual violence in conflict zones point to large numbers ranging from fifty
thousand reported rapes in Bosnia in the early 1990s, between a hundred thousand and a million
German women raped at the end of the Second World War by Soviet Soldiers, a quarter of a million
sexual assaults in the wars of Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and half a million rapes in in the Rwandan
genocide (Heineman, 2011). The relationship between sex and violence is even more ancient than
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all these relatively modern conflicts. Physical violence against women was very common in Greek
and Roman warfare narratives; it was apt to occur on the night of capturing a city and involved
slavery or rape. Ancient Greek and Byzantine Greek narratives often use the term “andrapodized”
(andrapodizein, andrapodizesthai) as part of ancient warfare. This verb refers to the turning of war
captives into slaves or subjugates (andrapoda) (Heineman, 2011). It stands to reason that
subordinating captured women was crucial to the origins of Western warfare. The domination of
people was a first step toward extracting the benefits and natural resources from a captured land
(Heineman, 2011).
In the most basic sense, sex is just part of the economy of war. War requires men to fight
and these men require a steady supply of sex, in the same way that arms or food are needed. As
one American General, George Patton said of his troops: “if they don’t fuck, they don’t ﬁght”
(Seedat, 2016). The concept of sexual economy is best illustrated in the case of the Japanese
comfort system. “Comfort women” were used to provide sex for soldiers in Indonesia, Thailand,
Burma, Vietnam and other areas conquered during the Second World War (Tanaka, 2001). This
system was first set up as a response to the atrocities of mass rape committed by Japanese soldiers
to local citizens, but as the war extended, military leaders believed that the provision of comfort
women was a good way to compensate their soldiers. By 1938, the system became well interlocked
with the Japanese military system (Tanaka, 2001). Similarly, the, “blue lamp” which was the code
word for British brothels formed part of British strategy during World War I. During World War
II 30,000 women are estimated to have been forced into sex slavery in Nazi occupied Eastern
Europe to provide sexual services to the army. A much more recent example that is many ways
similar to that of ISIS is the supply of girls and young women from Chibok to the Boko Haram
fighters (Seedat, 2016).
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What makes the case of the Islamic State unique is that ISIS believes in a God-given
doctrine that in their worldview legitimizes and even encourages forms of sexual slavery. This
point is of great significance because it shows how violence may be tolerated to the extent it carries
a rational, utilitarian functionalist justification. In the case of ISIS, our sensibilities are more
disturbed by it being justified not as a necessary evil but by divine right in comparison to other
acts of mass murder like Truman’s annihilation of Japanese civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
which was justified as retribution.
In the worldview of ISIS, sexual slavery is necessary to purify the caliphate, and is also a
reward for those who are involved in Jihad. The fourth issue of the ISIS newsletter Dabiq produced
in the month of Dhul Hijja 1435 (CE 26 September -24 October 2014) explains the legalities of
enslavement through a direct link between enslaving Yazidi women and the nearing of the end of
times. The abandonment of slavery is seen to have occasioned various forms of immorality and its
revival signals the coming of the hour (Seedat, 2016).
Another article in published in Dabiq in 2014 explains that:
“…a number of contemporary scholars have mentioned that the desertion of slavery had led to an
increase in fāhishah (adultery, fornication, etc.), because the shar’ı̄alternative to marriage is not
available, so a man who cannot afford marriage to a free woman ﬁnds himself surrounded by
temptation towards sin. In addition, many Muslim families who have hired maids to work at their
homes, face the ﬁtnah of prohibited khalwah (seclusion) and resultant zinā [adultery] occurring
between the man and the maid, whereas if she were his concubine, this relationship would be
legal. This again is from the consequences of abandoning jihād and chasing after the dunyā
(world), wallāhul-musta’ān (and in God we seek help). May Allah bless this Islamic State with
the revival of further aspects of the religion occurring at its hands.” (As cited in Seedat,2016)

There is much contention surrounding the texts and interpretations from which the selfclaimed Islamic State draws its ideologies, but in the worldview of ISIS these sexual practices are
legitimized by texts that support the institution of concubinage.
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“O Prophet, indeed We have made lawful to you your wives…those your right hand possesses
from what Allah has returned to you [of captives] …and a believing woman if she gives herself to
the Prophet [and] if the Prophet wishes to marry her, [this is] only for you, excluding the [other]
believers… You, [O Muhammad], may put aside whom you will of them or take to yourself whom
you will. And any that you desire of those [wives] from whom you had [temporarily] separated there is no blame upon you [in returning her]. “(Surah Al-Ahzab 33:50-53)
Surah Al-Muminun (23:6) and Surah Al-Maarij (70:30) both, highlight a distinction between
ْ اﺟ ِﮭ ْﻢ أ َ ْو َﻣﺎ َﻣ َﻠﻜ
spouses and "those whom one's right hands possess" (female slaves), saying " َﺖ
ِ أ َ ْز َو
"أَ ْﯾ َﻤﺎﻧُ ُﮭ ْﻢ. ISIS also finds legal grounding to legitimize its practices in the institution of “term” or
“temporary marriage” which aims at providing immediate erotic fulﬁlment without marital
obligations (Dialmy, 2010). According to some hadiths as quoted in Sexuality and Islam (2010),
“… social order [...] requires male control of women’s bodies and sexuality. Female sexuality, if
uncontrolled, could lead to social chaos” (Dialmy, 2010). Other significant texts that provide
theological support for ISIS are referenced in Aš-Šāṭiʼ(2006) and Bouhdiba(2012).
It is also worth mentioning that ISIS draws from a socio-political legacy where sexual
violence was notoriously used by the Iraqi secret police against citizens. Gender inequality became
even more vivid during the sanctions era following the Gulf war, when the regime turned to tribal
values to gain dominance and accordingly polygamy and honor killing were revived. In 2000, the
regime publicly hanged many Iraqi women accused of prostitution for defaming Iraq’s honor
(Ahram, 2015). With the collapse of the state, sex trafficking of Iraqi women increased, according
to NGO estimates, in the years 2003–06, between 2,000 and 3,500 Iraqi women disappeared, and
many were trafficked. Honor killing was widely used creating further divisions between
communities an example of that was in the stoning to death of a 17-year-old Yazidi who was in a
relationship with a Sunni; the stoning was videotaped and posted on the internet as a threat against
mixed marriage (Ahram, 2015).
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Under the U.S control of Iraq, sexual violence became instrumental in torturing suspected
terrorists such as the famous incident of the Abu-Gharib prison. It is interesting to note that many
of the ISIS militants were themselves once subject or witnesses of sexual violence at the hands of
the American army. At least nine of ISIS leaders including the commander Baghdadi were
themselves held captive in Camp Bucca (Ahram, 2015). In this sense, the Islamic state draws from
a socio-political legacy of patriarchal and tyrannical state forces that have often employed sexual
violence towards citizens and a theological worldview that idolizes sexual pleasure and demeans
the other. The sexual slavery of Yezidis is thus a byproduct of many factors that in many ways
make ISIS a unique case.
A case for Genocide
Although ISIS has destroyed the social fabric of Iraqi society as a whole by targeting all
minority groups; Christian, Shiites, Kurds and at times Sunnis, and all minorities have suffered
great losses, the Yezidi population is by far the most vivid case subject to ISIS genocidal efforts
because of their beliefs (Whiteside, 2015). In this sense, establishing the caliphate meant that it
had to be purified from all non-believers. The atrocities committed against Yezidis, be it that of
cultural cleansing, or the abduction of thousands of women and children and the resulting largescale displacement are all evidence of acts of genocide that place Yezidis in danger of extinction
(Lamani & Momani, 2010).
Most of the criteria of Genocide be it; “an overt justification for genocide, the capacity of
armed groups to conduct it, political motivations for genocide, genocidal acts and mass killings,
evidence of the intent to destroy, and possible events that might trigger plans for the full resourcing
of a genocide campaign (United Nations, 1948), are met through the crimes committed against

43

Yezidis. The only criterion that provides a challenge is the state dimension which is characteristic
of Genocide acts.
However, it can well be argued that with many territories and institutions under its rule,
the Islamic state, though it is not recognized or bound by norms based expectations, currently plays
the same role as that of the state. This involves implementing Sharia law, taxes, and control of
health, education, culture, electricity and oil revenues. The Islamic state both mimics and competes
with the state. Physical and sexual violence are utilized to ensure its reign as a replacement of the
previous infidel states, simultaneously ISIS mimics the state’s coercive measures that were once
used against citizens and Islamic militants. In light of this, it is significant to take into consideration
that in the age of globalization and the weakening of the state, new forms of state like actors have
appeared that deserves the reconsideration of the state criterion in the Genocide convention. The
advent of the Islamic State suggests that the convention should not be restrictively applied to the
nation-state in the traditional sense but should include new forms of ‘state-like actors’ (Whiteside,
2015). It is worth noting that the term genocide evolved as a consequence of certain events that
took place even before the term came into existence but it was bound by a specific context in which
the state had the right to use force, likewise, the new context that globalization has offered signifies
that new structures can be included in determining what a state is even if this was not included in
Lemkin’s definition. In this sense, Weber’s (1919) definition of what a state is; an entity that
maintains monopoly to legitimately use force in a certain geographic area, evidently applies to
ISIS.
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Chapter 2
Methodology
Narrative Theory
Over the last few decades, researchers have shown an increasing interest in individuals and
group narratives which became known as the narrative turn (Goodson &Gill, 2011). Utilizing
narrative was certainly not a new concept but what was new in the past few decades, was the
institutionalization of narrative emerging as an autonomous object of inquiry. Some scholars have
precisely identified three narrative turns. The first is within literary studies, in the 1960s signifying
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a structuralist, scientiﬁc and descriptive rhetoric to the study of narrative. In historiography, the
turn to narrative theory indicated criticism of naive master narratives as presented by White in
1993.In the social sciences this began, in the early 1980s and took a general anti-positivist and
often humanist approach to the study of human psychology and culture (Goodson, 2009).
Accordingly, this narrative turn challenged the positivist approach in its examination of the social
world and the fact that it places the social researcher outside the social reality, independent from
the context which they are a part of.
This narrative turn is in many ways is a product of postmodernism; emerging in the context
of a new wave of philosophical discussion about the relationship between the self and the social
world. Lyotard’s rejection of grand narratives and the tendency to consider alternative, small,
forgotten, and untold stories, which was first taken over in feminist studies gave way to a new
discourse viewing “life as narrative” (Hyvärinen, 2007). The move from modernist master
narratives to the postmodern multiple disrupted notions of subjectivity was accompanied by a
focus on Life history and narrative as a methodology (Goodson, 2009).
Central to this postmodernist discussion was a reexamination of the self and the individual
as a social actor; personal narratives therefore provided an opposing paradigm by providing
knowledge from the inside out and accordingly bridging the gap between the individual and the
social world. ( Maynes, Pierce& Laslett, 2008)The main theories of Social Sciences formerly used,
have left a legacy of viewing the individual through categories be it race, gender or social class
placing them outside the social world and consequently social actors are treated as if they have no
individual history. Modern western notions of the self that have been constructed through
enlightenment discourses have portrayed a bold universal human subject. This European
hegemonic western “Self” became subject to much criticism by different voices; Feminist,
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Foucauldian and third-world voices that began to propose new notions of the self, separate from
that produced by the enlightenment project ( Maynes, Pierce& Laslett, 2008)
The functional properties of narratives are fundamental to this research. As McAdams
(1995) argues, identity is in itself an evolving inner story of the self. Human beings “…create
identity in their lives to the extent that the self can be told in a coherent, followable, and vivifying
narrative that integrates the person into society in a productive and generative way and provides
the person with a purposeful self-history that explains how the self of yesterday became the self of
today and will become the anticipated self of tomorrow… (McAdams, 1995)”. This becomes even
more significant in the case of refugees who have suffered losses and disruptions creating tangible
discontinuity in their understanding of their self and their surroundings (Mahmoud, 2009).
Accordingly, narrative is not only a methodology of this research but the very tool through which
the interlocutors make sense of their world. The process of story-telling for refugees becomes a
coping mechanism through which they can comprehend and articulate their lives (Mahmoud,
2009).
Interviews
The accounts of each of the woman are an accumulation of several interviews. Most of the
interviews were free-flowing, open-ended and depended on the situation and flow of the
conversation, but in every interview I included a question on how the interlocutor survived the
siege of Sinjar. The narratives were written after meeting the woman or when I had a chance to be
alone and record some insights because I usually did not return from the camp until very late in
the evening. In some cases when specific details were provided such as in the account of Sabah
who provided details of being taken to different places between Syria and Iraq, I had to
immediately write those details. It must say that all the Yezidis I met were extremely approachable,
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welcoming and hospitable to strangers but they were all afraid. They refused to sign any consent
form that acknowledges their approval to participate and they also refused to have their interviews
recorded. It was a significant period of mistrust for the entire community, they were afraid of
forged stories being written about them, and many of their family members were still in captivity
so they were cautious not to reveal information that could harm them.
Hayat was the only interlocutor who did not mind being recorded and videotaped but after
the first interview I realized that being recorded was a barrier inhibiting the flow of emotions and
authenticity of expression so I had to rely on recording personal notes and observations. Although
the majority of Yezidis refused to have their interviews recorded or videotaped, in some cases, as
soon as the recording started respondents felt an obligation to preach about injustice or petition
their case rather than narrate their personal stories and for that reason recording was not always
the most reliable tool.
It also must be noted that the narratives included in the chapter are translated from the
original conversations I had with the women, which were either in Arabic and translated to English
or were in Krumanji, translated to Arabic and then to English. In some conversations there had to
be an interpreter which meant that all the information had to pass through several filters; first the
interlocutor, second the interpreter, third is the researcher who also has to translate information
into English for this research. All direct quotes are translated word for word but most of the stories
are paraphrased and as a result of that some of the language may sound unusual to English
speakers. It should also be noted that the names used in this research are pseudonyms as all the
ladies preferred to conceal their identity.
Ethnography
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Ethnographic fieldwork mostly included observations of Yezidi refugees in their everyday lives
inside the camps or in cafes, transportation, homes and work-settings. Ethnographic work also
included meeting with different people who worked with refugees mainly social workers in NGOs
most of them were Europeans and Americans but also some were Egyptians and Iraqis. I was also
very intentional in interviewing Christian refugees in the village of Bikhetmy as well as those of
Camp Shariah to give a holistic picture of how their experience of ISIS can be compared to that of
Yezidis. I also made use of the time I spent with Kurds be it in Erbil or in Dohuk to examine how
the local population perceive the situation and how they view Yezidis as a minority group. These
accounts were not necessarily included in the research but were essential in giving a
multidimensional, holistic approach to the issue.
Data Analysis
The narratives provided by the women as well as all the other interviews were analyzed
thematically. Coding the data involved organizing the raw data into conceptual categories and
creating themes. After identifying the major themes, I selectively chose data that would illustrate
certain themes making further connections and comparisons. Accordingly, this research conveys
a certain picture of these women at a particular point in time and place and therefore offers some
truths but it does not offer “the truth” about these women.
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Chapter 3
Introducing the Women
Most news coverage has often reduced Yezidis, to a fixed stereotype of “the slave girl”. This
reductionist view has in many ways dehumanized and commodified those women in much the
same way that their perpetrators did because it neglects the diversity, history, dreams and
ambitions that each of these women carries. This generalization is true for other Genocides as well.
Hunt (2004) in “Muslim Women in the Bosnian Crucible”, argues that while many think of Bosnian
women as victims, by focusing particularly on the systemic rape of thousands of them during the
war; the interviews conducted in her research shows that those women are essentially different,
energetic and are full of determination to restore their country.
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The uniqueness of each experience that these women lived begs us to dig deeper and
examine the diversity of what it is to be a Yezidi woman, beyond fixed categories of ethnicity,
religion, gender and refugee. As will be shown throughout the narratives, the process of identity
formation be it; ethnic, religious or gender are not culturally prescribed in a static, identical
manner, instead they are internalized inconsistently and divergently that even within families
individuals internalize versions of their culture differently (Gregg, 2007). As highlighted in the
chapter on methodology, the fact that identity is an inner evolving story means that the individual
is actively integrating the reconstructed past, the perceived present, and the anticipated future to
provide a life with unity, purpose, and meaning (McAdams, 1995). Through this process of
forming an inner story the individual may highlight various chapters of this story and conceal
others depending on what provides them with meaning and unity at the time of narration.
This chapter introduces each woman in the chronology in which I met them. It is important
to note that while I met many other Yezidi women, the reason why I included these five in my
research, is due to two main reasons. The first and the most obvious is that these women all showed
willingness to participate. For some Yezidi women it was not really a question of willingness but
of the ability to speak. Many of these who have survived traumatic experiences were really unable
to recall their memories and if they did the trauma was extremely overwhelming that the interview
had to be stopped. The second reason is purely a practical one and that is most of the Yezidis I met
specially women did not speak Arabic. I was lucky that three of the women, Sahar,Hayat and
Anhar spoke Arabic. Gulee and Sabah did not speak Arabic. When I first met Gulee, she made it
clear that she does not speak Arabic but the rest of the conversation was actually all in Arabic. She
was not fluent but it was good enough. In the case of Sabah, Anhar was the one doing the
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interpretation and it had to be so because if it wasn’t for Anhar, Sabah would have never trusted
me or accepted to give any piece of information.
I start with Hayat because she was the first I met and she also was the entry point to Sahar
and Gulee. These three women all live in the same camp and their lives are interconnected in
varying ways. Hayat is Sahar’s aunt and they both work in the same NGO which Hayat heads.
Sahar is one of the key people working in the team. Gulee is not related to the ladies but she attends
the Arabic classes which the NGO offers to help Yezidi girls adapt to their new surroundings. I
was introduced to Anhar and Sabah in a completely different setting. I knew Anhar first through a
common friend; I had no intention to include her in my research at first because she was only
helping me connect with Yezidi survivors given that she works in an NGO that serves survivors.
As our friendship grew and I got to know her story I felt a need to include her in this research.
Sabah is a client in Anhar’s NGO but as time went by their relationship developed and they have
become friends.
Hayat
Hayat Ibrahim Murad was more like an iconic symbol of resistance. Her two brothers had passed
away as “martyrs” in the civil war of 2007 and from thereon Hayat became the backbone of her
family. Hayat heads an NGO funded by a Lutheran foundation which aims at helping women and
children in the Be’adra camp. This camp hosts middle-upper class Yezidis mainly from Sinjar as
well as others from Mosul. After the siege and the days, she spent in the mountain; she decided to
give her life to empowering women in her community. She also provides a lot of services for
children and the elderly population.
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Hayat acts as a facilitator between the world outside the camp and the world inside. She was the
contact person and the entry point to the camp whenever doctors or social workers wanted to offer
their help. Having previously worked as a nurse in Sinjar, she was particularly interested in
tackling health related issues of the community and this also became her source of triumph when
ISIS attacked, because she was there to help the injured. What struck me the most about Hayat was
her openness and her willingness to cooperate with strangers; she seized every opportunity as a
chance to petition the Yezidi case before the whole world.
This new life in the camp was nothing like the old, the majority of Yezidis lived in green
fields in agriculture societies but they were now confined to a refugee camp in an unfamiliar
environment. The only way they maintained a sense of familiarity was by connecting to one
another. That is why Hayat’s project was significant in bringing those women together and
providing a channel through which they can preserve their community in the midst of this new and
unfamiliar setting.
I refuse to be a prey but I insist on fighting the enemy, I may not have guns or weapons but
I have my voice to speak. This project started a year ago and it was funded by the Lutheran
foundation to help women and survivors. My project includes many activities and different
trainings in various skills like poetry, sewing, singing and a lot of other things. I try to give
those girls hope, I previously had 13 survivors who came in a devastating state, but they
are all doing very well and are now working with NGOs. They want to tell the world that
they are not victims. I walked this journey with them from the very beginning. I gave them
the love and care they needed when they have no one to take care of them. I scheduled
therapy sessions for all those girls and I began by telling them that they are not alone and
that I have been in their shoes and gone through the same circumstances so that they would
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feel relaxed and not shameful about their rape experience. Many of them have moved on
and are now working and helping other girls, but they still come to visit and they are all
doing well and not a single one of them decided to leave Iraq. God gave us this life to live
and we must insist on living.
Hayat was also responsible for creating activities and events for young children. Most of those
children have been severely traumatized from the days they spent in the harsh mountain conditions.
A lot of them have lost their ability to speak and became disengaged; it was through music, art and
dancing activities that she would help those children recover. Hayat had no family of her own but
she considered herself responsible for the entire Yezidi community and particularly those young
children.
All my life, I did not do anything for myself but I live for my family and community and
that’s why I respect and collaborate with all who want to help Yezidis. We Yezidis are
simple people we have no hatred, we love people from all religions we love God, we
worship God and we follow the commands he says in all religions.
Hayat’s speech is supportive of how Yezidis over time developed an accommodative
strategy when dealing with the other as an attempt to highlight commonalities and conceal
differences in belief as suggested in much of the literature on Yezidis (Nicolaus, 2011). This was
also evident in how Hayat made it a point to explain that the name of camp Be’adra is closely
related to the word “virgin” which is used to refer to Virgin Mary, when she knew that I was
Christian.
Aside from helping other women and her dedication to the betterment of the community,
Hayat’s project was important in helping her acquire a new identity of the empowered Yezidi
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woman. As McAdams (1995) notes, Human beings create their identities to the extent that the self
can be told in a coherent narrative that integrates the person into society in a productive way and
provides the individual with a self-history that explains how the self of yesterday became the self
of today (McAdams, 1995). This project was significant for Hayat in that it allowed her create a
narrative of her own identity as a strong Yezidi woman. To maintain coherence of this new identity,
she had to reject other narratives that did not comply. This is why Hayat did not allow herself to
be weak or to express emotion because it was inconsistent with the narrative she tried to project of
the strong woman in the midst of chaos. Her choice, be it conscious or unconscious was to numb
her feelings altogether saying that “at times suffering is too great that you no longer feel.” Every
account Hayat gave be it of the siege or her injured sister-in-law or her father’s death was followed
by “I had to be strong” and being strong to her meant to no longer allow any penetration to her
emotions be it pain or joy.
Sahar
Sahar is Hayat’s niece and though she was only 16 at the time I met her, she was a key
employee in Nadia’s NGO and was particularly responsible for running the beauty salon. From
her outer appearance, this young girl looked like a typical westernized teenager. She was a peasant
girl but had nothing to do with the stereotypical image of a Yezidi peasant girl. Sahar looked very
composed and finely dressed on the outside but once she was left alone her sorrows surfaced,
leaving her in a pool of emotions that were just difficult to gather and confine.Sahar’s father died
almost ten years ago, and since then she’s been living with her mother and two brothers. Her older
brother had left to Germany and she is currently living with her mother and younger brother in
camp Be’adra. The absence of a male figure particularly her father was a constant aching wound
for Sahar. Her cousin is severely traumatized and can barely speak; I was told that since the attacks
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he started experiencing fear and anxiety to the extent of wetting his bed at night. Her other brother
is too young to take care of the family. Sahar felt that there was nothing more painful in life than
the loss of her father and had he been alive nothing would have happened to them.
My father died in a Sunni Yezidi clash in 2007, he died as a martyr because he was trying
to protect our people. We Yezidis are used to suffering; we have been through a lot of
persecution in our history but there is nothing like what is happening now. The situation
of Yezidis is much worse than any other time, at least in the past we were living alone in
our land but now we are dispersed everywhere.
I was keen to know what Sahar plans for her future. She had missed several years of schooling
since the events and decided not to join the camp’s school. She was not interested in education and
was not confident that she could make-up the years she had missed from school but she loved to
make people beautiful and this is what she wanted to do in life.
I’m responsible for running this Salon because Hayat is not here most of the time and I
love it. I love making those girls beautiful.Those Daesh guys want us because we are
beautiful, it is not about religion or anything but they say Yezidi girls are too beautiful to
be left alone. The result is most of those girls returning from ISIS are in self-hatred they
try to take their own lives because they feel so filthy and unworthy”.
Sahar’s narrative shows a different perspective to the war project, one that is not ideological
but instrumental and in a sense self-celebratory. Sahar’s explanation of why Yezidis were
targeted is simply based on the fact that Yezidis are celebrated for their physical appearance
and the basic war economy that men need sex to be able to fight.
Marian:How do you feel being here in the Camp?
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Sahar:It was very difficult in the beginning. For days I couldn’t sleep and didn’t know if
what we went through was real or not. I did not know why life is so difficult, why all this
would happen to us and to my mother, it is a terrible feeling not knowing if you will see
some people again or not…. But Hamdellah, Hamdellah
Marian:Do you feel the situation is a bit better compared to what it was when you first
came?”
Sahar:It is both easier and harder…easier because we got used to it and we are not in the
same shock but harder, much harder when this becomes your life and nothing is changing.
Life was already difficult, now it is the same challenges plus all that we have to go
through.”
The grieve she carried over the loss of her father, which was intensified after the events
left her feeling depressed and alone even though she was popular and she was doing a great job in
the Salon. Sahar was focused on doing things that would engage her and give her a sense of
gratification and she found that in beautifying girls. She was so determined to make those girls
look and feel beautiful even if it was a temporary moment of relief. For Sahar, the best survival
mechanism on the emotional level was to keep herself distracted from her thoughts and emotions.
She had to keep herself busy for as long as she could. I often wondered why Sahar took her job so
seriously to the extent of overworking herself. The reason behind her strong commitment was
revealed by her mother during a visit to their shelter. The first weeks of their settlement in the
camp were very difficult for Sahar to the extent that she stopped eating and drinking and was
always crying and withdrawn, if it wasn’t for Hayat’s intervention Sahar would have died in
misery.
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What was obvious from observing Sahar and the answers she gave was her depressive
tendency. Unlike her aunt, Sahar was extremely emotional. She was too absorbed in her sorrows
in a way that made her feel extremely hopeless and helpless. Sahar’s strategy in dealing with her
emotions was to keep herself distracted. Her emotions were strong, frequent and overtly displayed
and in fear of sinking in her emotions, just like the months following her return she had to distract
by keeping herself busy. Even her investment in dressing well was rather a way of diverting her
focus from her inner-state to her outer appearance and it was about presenting a different image
through her physique than the image she had of her inner-self. Just by going to the Salon and
engaging with the women she started feeling better and her mood improved significantly. It is also
worth noting that her work in the beauty-salon helped alleviate her depression because she saw the
rewards of it. She began to appreciate her own talents, though she previously despised her abilities
and seeing that she was impactful enough to make those women feel beautiful made her find
something to wake up for every day.
Gulee
Gulee is an interesting thirteen-year-old; she was captured when she was eleven and spent a year
under ISIS. I first met Gulee and her mother during one of the Arabic sessions held in Hayat’s
NGO. Gulee wasn’t a regular attendant because she was a school student and she wasn’t interested
in the lady salon or most of the other activities that the women did. She was extremely focused on
her studies even during the summer vacation and she rarely showed any interest in interacting with
the rest of the women. The only class she was interested in was the Arabic class because she was
so eager to perfect her Arabic now that she was living in Dohuk. She made a much greater progress
even more than her mother and was able to speak the language fluently in a very short period.
Gulee was innocent looking and extremely small in size but what was particularly special about
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her was her sweet smile that never left her face. Our encounters during the Arabic classes were
mostly brief and she avoided getting into long conversations with anyone.
I did not plan to invade her privacy and never intended to include her in my research but I
was deeply moved by how little interaction she made with anyone around her. She was very polite
and remarkably intelligent but her shyness made it difficult for anyone to approach her and she
ended up alone most of the time. The reason why she was seemingly withdrawn and spent most of
her time in solitude was her deep longing for her best friend who was still under ISIS. She had not
heard any news about her friend since her release and return to Dohuk and her friend’s illness
made her even more concerned about her fate. Despite this longing, Gulee was extremely hopeful
that her friend will return, but more importantly the young girl was extremely hopeful about life.
I have a lot of hope she will be freed soon; this is the one thing I keep asking God for. But
I miss her and I’m worried about her health. She is my only friend.
The period Gulee spent in captivity gave her courage and determination to face life and she was
determined to become a medical doctor, which is why she was focused on excelling in school.
Gulee was too determined and task oriented about her goals in life, she almost seemed to be in a
race against time. At first I thought that the reason why she wanted to be a doctor was because it
was a prestigious job and certainly because there was a need in her community, but for Gulee the
reason was personal, it was about her best-friend. By becoming a doctor Gulee wanted to do in her
adulthood, what she failed to do as a child. She wants to be in control and to have the ability to
cure others which is something she could not do to her friend.
Gulee is one among a new generation of Yezidis who have been uprooted from the
traditional life back in Sinjar. The tough experience she has gone through together with the
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challenging environment she currently lives in, has stirred in her a desire to grow and advance
beyond the traditional norms that were dictated by her society. She is determined to learn and to
work unlike her mother and older generations who did not invest in their education and careers
because they grew up back in the villages of Sinjar where there was little exposure to the outside
world.

Anhar
I was first introduced to Anhar through a common friend. Anhar was a beautiful, educated
lady in her late twenties. She was extremely well-dressed, westernized and was fluent in Arabic
and English besides Kurmanji. It was clearly obvious that she came from an affluent family, and
when introducing herself she mentioned that she was a “Sheikha”, a title given to upper-class
Yezidis. Anhar worked as a counselor in an NGO that helps Yazidis, particularly females who
have just returned from ISIS. I was not planning to include Anhar in the research because at first I
only saw her as a channel that would link me to the “victims” but as time went by and as those
stereotypes began to crumble, I decided to include her in the research.
Anhar was very helpful in assisting some of the meetings I had with Yezidi survivors,
particularly Sabah, but I had not known much about Anhar until one time when we were visiting
the holy city of Lalish, this is when she told me her story of hiding in her house for 10 days. She
was however, reluctant at first to share her experience. It could be due to the fear and pain that she
experienced when recalling the memory and it could also be due to the fact that she positioned
herself as the person giving help and therefore wanted to avoid exposing her vulnerabilities. Her
own experience however, became the reason behind her ability to help those women. Anhar
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believes that her experience of hiding in the house and her departure from Sinjar resulted in a
massive personal transformation. Anhar describes herself before the events as an extremely selfcentered and spoilt girl but after the events things changed completely for her.
The terror she experienced developed in her a sense of compassion towards survivors
because she knew that she could have easily been in their shoes. She was now spending most of
her time visiting survivors in the camps and counseling survivors who came to the NGO. Anhar
lives with her mother and sister in an apartment in the city of Dohuk, while her brother is currently
living in Germany. Although her mother had insisted on not leaving Iraq permanently, they do
spend a lot of time in Europe with her brother.
Anhar’s experience during the capture of Sinjar was a source of transformation that made
her reevaluate everything in her life. Her struggle with those fearful memories drove her to help
those dealing with traumatic memories by counseling them in their journey of recovery. There was
also another significant factor in Anhar’s life which drove her to help survivors, and that was her
sense of loneliness. Anhar explains that “she feels alone in life,” her father died, her brother was
in Germany, her mother was a sick lady and she was not close to her sister. Anhar was also
conscious of the fact that she was not married and didn’t have children, and part of the way she
dealt with her sense of loneliness was to connect with those women, who eventually became “her
family” as she once described them. The reward was mutual, the women felt cared for and for
Anhar spending time with the women helped diminish her sense of loneliness and gave her a
greater purpose to live for.
Although Anhar was extremely helpful in connecting me with the women, my experience
with the NGO she worked in was not the same. There was a lot of mistrust and suspicion shown
by the Scandinavian lady who heads the NGO. The only reason I was finally granted access to
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survivors was because I made a deal with the Scandinavian lady to provide free medical services
through the NGO I was helping with, in exchange for attending some interviews with Anhar.
Sabah
Sabah was a regular visitor to YAZNA, but more than being a client, she was a dear friend of
Anhar. This relationship would have not naturally developed back in Sinjar given the social and
cultural differences between the two ladies, but the new setting and the experience they have lived
seemed to dissolve social and cultural barriers. Sabah and her three children were taken as captives
during the siege of Sinjar. I accidently happened to know during a conversation that she had a
fourth child who was still in captivity but she rarely mentioned anything about her. Missing family
members was so common that most Yezidis were grateful if only one or two of their family
members were still alive. The reason why Sabah never mentioned anything about her missing
fourth child remains unknown to me but it was a topic she avoided speaking about. But there was
also a strong sense of guilt that she felt towards her missing child which she always had to
camouflage, by emphasizing how she did her best to save her children.
Sabah was released from ISIS three months prior to my visit and was now living with her
husband and three children. What was notable was that her body still carried marks of the time she
spent in captivity. When I first saw Sabah’s hair during a visit to her shelter in the camp, I was
struck by how unevenly cut her hair was, which is why she normally covered it by a loose scarf.
Her daughter also had the same uneven hair cut with areas in her hair completely shaved off as.
As I continued to observe her face and body there were other signs that could not be missed. As
she pulled her breast out to feed her youngest child I was able to see some bruises and scars on her
chest, but there was also a huge tattoo on her breast of a word in Kurmanji. When she realized I
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was looking at her tattoo, she looked back at me and smiled explaining that this was Abu-Amar’s
name – her husband.
This name kept me going those past months, I missed him a lot and did not know if he would have
me back or not, but I did all I can to preserve myself and our children.
The love Sabah had for her husband as he passionately waited for her return; refusing to
abandon her against all social norms was crucial in her journey of recovery. Abu-Amar’s love for
her made her overcome feelings of shame and rejection. In Sabah’s situation romance was an
important coping strategy that helped her move on. Her husband’s promise to make her another
wedding now that she is back was also of great significance to her. Besides it being a reminder of
their wedding which she described as the best day in her life, there was also something restoring
in knowing that she would be celebrated after the shame she had experienced.
Sabah worked hard on restoring families of those around her as well. She was a strong
advocate that families should accept the return of girls who were abducted and raped and she
worked hard to help many of the families accept their daughters. The fact that her husband patiently
waited for her return and accepted her drove her to fight for other girls’ right to return. More
importantly this was also the way she dealt with her sense of guilt over her missing child. It was
surprising to see that she was willing to give so much detail and talk openly about a lot of what
she has been through but turned silent and never mentioned anything about her missing child. It
was easier for Sabah to talk about the humiliation she had experienced than to talk about her
missing daughter. Her defensive tone when narrating how her child was lost and that she did her
best signifies the pain she was dealing with and her longing for the return of her missing child.
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This chapter has introduced the reader to the five main interlocutors of this research; Hayat, Sahar,
Anhar, Gulee and Sabah. As shown, these five Yezidi women vary in age, background, personal
traits and interests but they have all survived a specific historical moment - the Yezidi genocide.
The next chapter reveals how each woman experienced the siege of Sinjar by looking at the effect
that trauma has on memory. Besides the five main interlocutors, the chapter also includes accounts
given by other informants to show the interplay between the individual and the collective
experience.

Chapter 4
Narrating the Yezidi Genocide: The fall of Sinjar

Memory and trauma
An important question arises, what is the relevance of narrating those accounts? After all,
these women are not public figures, they are nameless, faceless, and their accounts do not offer
reliable historical facts. The question of whether or not to integrate survivors’ accounts in the
historiography of genocide is not a new one. Historians of genocide have intentionally avoided
oral testimonies due to the crucial role that memory plays. It is memory that allows witnesses to
access their experiences but the “tricks” that memory plays can easily jeopardize the credibility of
those accounts (La Capra,2016). As Stanley Cohen (2001) puts it, memory is not a filing cabinet
that we open to examine a pre-selected file but it is rather a book we are writing and editing and
the more ambiguous the event, the more room there is for this memory work (Cohen, 2001).
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The need to include first hand testimonies was awakened at the beginning of the 21st
century particularly in relation to Holocaust survivors. Approaching a time when the last survivors
of the Holocaust would have died created an urge to document survivors’ accounts. This was
further emphasized by members of second and third generations of Holocaust survivors who have
come to acknowledge the ways in which the traumatic memories of their family members have
been passed on to them (Postpone, 2003). Testimonies are important in understanding experience
and its aftermath and part of that includes understanding the role of memory and its lapses, in
coming to terms with, repressing and denying the past. Even if a survivor’s account may include
factual inaccuracies, distortions, imaginative transformation, denial or repression, these issues do
not invalidate the experience in entirety. The survivor is not only reliving the experiences in the
process of recalling but is working over and working through his or her memory (Postone, 2003).
Selma Leydesdorff, author of “Surviving the Bosnian Genocide” notes that when interviewing her
Bosnian survivors, she was thoroughly confronted with fragmented memories. Leydesdorff notes
that in all the accounts she heard there were only shreds of memory and incomplete narrative.
Memory is fragmented this is how it presents itself after such trauma. (Leydesdorff, 2011).
Understanding the nature of trauma is essential to be able to understand its effect on
memory. The term trauma was originally used to refer to an injury inflicted on the body but was
later integrated into psychiatry to become known as a wound that is inflicted not upon the body
but the mind. This breach in the mind’s experience of time and the self in relation to the world is
unlike the wound of the body, a simple healable event, rather it is an event that is experienced too
soon and in an unexpected manner that makes it incomprehensible. It is therefore not available at
the level of consciousness until it imposes itself again be it in repeated nightmares or actions
(Caruth, 1996).
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Research done on memory of war and genocide have revealed that trauma has the ability
to drastically alter memory; this can be by repressing the recollection of difficult events causing
them to be highly fragmented or inconceivable. Alternatively, trauma can cause those memories
to be of extreme clarity to the extent that the survivor can relive those events again and experience
physical symptoms when recalling those events (Chaitin & Steinberg, 2013). When interviewing
traumatized people everything seems distant yet extremely close, in the past but happening now
(Brehm& Fox, 2016). As Cathy Caruth (1996) contends, the return of the traumatic experience is
an unconscious attempt to master what was never fully grasped in the first place. In other words,
trauma is a story of a wound that cries out in the attempt to tell us of a reality or a truth that is not
otherwise available. The interesting aspect of trauma is that it is not only a sign of destruction but
also of survival, the repetition or re-visitation of the traumatic experience in this sense is not simply
an attempt to grasp that one has almost died but more profoundly an attempt to claim that one has
survived (Caruth, 1996)
The crucial role that trauma plays in altering memory was significantly tangible during the
interviews I conducted for this research. It is worth mentioning that I chose to focus on those five
women because a lot of the women I interviewed were unable to speak. For many others who were
willing, narrating those memories led to all kinds of physical and psychological reactions that were
hard to control because of their inability to separate the past from the present. This became even
more visible when there was sexual assault involved. At times the memory of rape or torture was
extremely overpowering that the victim would start reliving the experience, shaking and falling to
the ground. This was the story of one of the victims I met in Camp Be’adra. She was a woman in
her late 30s who had spent a humiliating year in captivity. When I first met her I was struck by her
sight, she did not look like a helpless victim but rather like an angry beast. Her legs were too wide
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apart and her knees bent. She was unable to close her legs while walking or sitting and her ear
lobes were torn which was a common feature in many raped victims, where the rapist would snatch
the girls’ earrings from her ears. The girl was constantly screaming, rocking her chair until she fell
to the ground. Her body would shake uncontrollably until her mother took her back home. I was
told she was raped over thirty times! No one could bear or handle the presence of this girl, as much
as they pitied her. Her presence was a constant reminder of the trauma they had lived.
Rape and sexual assault have become strongly associated with the Yezidi genocide both in
the minds of an outsider and in the collective memory of Yezidis. In every conversation I had the
issue of rape was mentioned. Those who were not raped felt great victory and were less ashamed
than those who did. At times, the issue of rape was openly discussed when the individuals did not
experience rape themselves and at other times it was the elephant in the room. The victim may not
have openly talked about the details of her rape but memories haunted her causing physical
symptoms that spoke louder than the words she could have shared. At times silence surrounding
rape was achieved by the use of indirect and metaphorical language. Veena Das (2007) in her
powerful ethnography on raped and abducted women during the 1947 partition in India notes that
when it came to the issue of rape there was a zone of silence surrounding the narrative. At times,
this silence was achieved through the use of language that was general and metaphoric but avoided
description of any specific event, or by describing surrounding events but leaving the actual
experience of rape unstated (Das, 2007).
I was warned to avoid any physical interaction not to even shake hands with any woman
because any physical touch could stimulate memories of how her body was violated. This was
very unusual to a culture where women greeted each other by kissing each other on the cheek. An
Egyptian friend and social worker had told me the story of how during a visit to the camp a Yezidi
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girl fainted when she heard his Egyptian accent; she later explained that her rapist was an Egyptian
ISIS militant. One of the girls I met could not lift her head up, for an entire hour she could not look
me in the eye and could not speak a single word. Suicide attempts were also very common
particularly when the girls were still in captivity. To many of the raped girls, their physical bodies
were a constant reminder of the humiliation they experienced which caused them to despise their
bodies in the most damaging ways. The hatred they felt towards their bodies was translated into
pulling out their hair and injuring themselves. I was advised to buy body lotions and cream when
meeting a victim of rape to help her be kind to her body. Even in the case of many girls who were
not enslaved, rape was a constant threat. Faiza was a lady I met in Camp Be’adra when I was in
the company of Hayat and Sahar. Faiza managed to flee with her husband when ISIS attacked, but
since the events she has been getting constant nightmares of militants raping her. The nightmares
were so intense that she began fearing her own husband. Faiza shared her story because she was
so desperate to make her marriage work but those nightmares were constantly in the way.
Nightmares are always a common element in the accounts of survivors of mass atrocity; research
on survivors of the Armenian and Rwandan genocide have shown that nightmares were pervasive
for both victim groups but particularly Tutsi survivors because the images of violence are still
fresh in their consciousness (Miller&Miller, 2004).
Gaps and silences were an eminent feature of all the accounts given. It is important to
distinguish the forms of silence that may exist. Sometimes silence may come in the form of
abstinence and denial to the extent of amnesia. The individual may fail to deal with such painful
memories that denial and abstinence become the only resort. I recall Hany, Dalal’s eldest son and
I remember him well because this was my first camp visit in Iraq, it was in Camp Khanki. This
camp was particularly impoverished and hosted the underprivileged Yezidis. I had passed by
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Dalal’s family that day because the children were in need of shoes. The children had no shoes to
protect their feet from the excruciating summer heat and the harsh winter conditions. Dalal was
excited to see her children wearing shoes for the first time in a long time. There was however a
young man sitting at the side of the humble shelter, he was her older son. He moved his head from
side to side but avoided any direct eye contact, and neither spoke nor moved. I did not know what
he went through but it was a state of abstinence from life. Dalal later explained that he saw an ISIS
militant kill his best friend and since then he became like a child, even younger than his five-yearold sister. Since that day he could no longer speak or move his legs or function at all.
At other times, silences and gaps may come in the form of giving different bits and pieces
of information over the course of several interviews almost like a puzzle where the bits and pieces
have to be matched together. This was the case of the majority of interviews. They were not
thoroughly articulated and did not come from a single interview. This was particularly evident in
the case of Gulee and Sabah. None of the ladies have provided information or details on how they
managed to escape, we know that in both cases a broker helped them but not much has been said
about the details of the escape. Similarly, Gulee did not say much about her ill friend and Sabah
never mentioned details about her missing child until much later. Denial was particularly common
because a lot of the survivors were afraid that giving details about their experience could harm
their captive relatives. This was the case with Malvine, one of the girls I interviewed during a visit
to Lalish. I knew from Malvine’s counselor that the girl and her mother have survived an extremely
brutal experience during their captivity, but she refused to give any details because she feared that
revealing such information could be dangerous to her cousin who was still in captivity. When
introducing herself Malvine told me that she was lucky she was not captured and that they managed
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to escape before ISIS came in, but she explained that her cousin is still in captivity and her owners
are asking for one hundred thousand dollars for her release.
There were several gaps in the narrative as in the case of Hayat and Sahar, they both
repeatedly expressed that there were no men left in the family even though we know from Hayat
that she called her brother (which could be her cousin) when ISIS first attacked. This belief that
there were no men left in the family clearly demonstrates the sense of abandonment that the two
ladies have experienced. It also affirms Hayat’s perception of herself as an empowered woman
who was able to survive and help others despite the absence of men in the family. Research shows
that people’s recollections influence their self-perception and vice-versa. Memories may be altered
or distorted to support certain aspects that the person believes of himself and it is therefore a way
of maintaining self-coherence. In this sense, memories remain consistent with the individual’s selfimage and goals, which is why Hayat repeatedly claimed that there were no men in the family
(Chaitin & Steinberg, 2013).
When narrating such accounts one may become voiceless, this does not mean the absence
of speech but one can become voiceless even when using words. At times the individual even
when talking about a personal experience can choose to distance oneself from the words spoken.
The words spoken are frozen and lifeless almost as if there is another voice doing the narration
(Das,2007). This type of silence is much subtler to identify because despite the interviewee’s
willingness to speak and give information they were almost not present in the conversation or it
was as if they were speaking about a different person other than themselves.
It is also worth noting that the sharing of traumatic memories is not only difficult for the
victim narrating the events but also for the listener. The listener comes to be a participant or even
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a co-owner of the traumatic event and gradually begins to partially experience the trauma himself
as he begins to empathize with the victim’s emotions, feels his injury and experiences his
confusions and this creates a living connection to the past in the present not only for the narrator
but the listener to (Brehm & Fox, 2016). This became a recurring theme during the time I spent
with those women, even hours after the interview my mood was still affected by the interviews
which often manifested in repeated nightmares. Inevitably, this also has an impact on the narration
of those events as the listener’s imagination and memory of the accounts heard impact what he
writes.
As problematic as memory may be, the integration of survivors’ accounts into
historiography is indispensable. Leydesdorff asserts that the first step in writing the history of any
grand trauma is to break the silence by giving voice to the victims (Leydesdorff, 2011). However,
I must add that while conducting those interviews I realized that the idea of breaking the silence
and giving voice to the victim is not as heroic as it is often depicted. Without empathy which Cathy
Caruth sheds light to in her work on trauma (Caruth, 1996) the need to break the silence may be
driven by a need to know information which may come at the expense of the victim who has to
deal with the pain inflicted. Das (2007) puts it best in the following quotation:
“It is often considered the task of historiography to break the silences that announce the zones of
taboo. There is even something heroic in the image of empowering women to speak and to give
voice to the voiceless. I have myself found this a very complicated task, for when we use such
imagery as breaking the silence; we may end by using our capacity to “unearth” hidden facts as a
weapon. Even the idea that we should recover the narratives of violence becomes problematic
when we realize that such narratives cannot be told unless we see the relation between pain and
language that a culture has evolved.”
It must be noted that survivors’ non-neutrality in telling their testimonies does not make
those testimonies less true. Historian Dominique La Capra, commenting on the importance of
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survivors’ accounts, notes that memory can as a matter of fact accurately supplement or even
correct written history and recorded archives, even the “tricks” that memory tends to play and the
reasons for their occurrence are themselves valid and valuable objects of historical scrutiny (La
Capra, 2016). By accepting the memories of others, even if they are peculiar and unpleasant, we
are laying the foundation for a legitimate and democratic approach into the future (Leydesdorff,
2011). Which is why according to LaCapra, memory of trauma is a prominent feature of history
that should not be “airbrushed or denied” (LaCapra, 2016).
For survivors, the sharing of such experiences helps by giving relevance and context to
what they have gone through, when people tell their stories they create a place for themselves in
the world. Those autobiographical memories are not only relevant for the individual alone but for
the community as a whole. This is due to the fact that the relationship between autobiographical
memory which relates to the individual and collective memory which Halbwachs (1992) defines
as knowledge relating to the past that is shared, mutually acknowledged, and reinforced by
collective groups, is inseparable. In this sense there is a connection between the culture and the
psyche. An event experienced at the collective level of the community supplies the substance of
the trauma which will be manifested in the individual experience and in return, individual suffering
is a sign of the trauma experienced as the collective level (Fassin&Rechtman, 2009)
The connection between the individual and collective memory becomes more apparent
when discussing genocide, this type of memory is commonly known as “cultural trauma” (Brehm
&Fox, 2016). Cultural trauma characteristically applies to a memory shared by a group of people
that relates to mass atrocity. Consequently, memory is also responsible for creating and affirming
collective feelings. Volkan (2006) explains that the ‘‘injured selves’’ of the victims of the trauma
are transmitted to the next generation and the next generation passes it onto the next, the result is
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that the group continuously unconsciously ‘‘chooses’’ the representation of the ancestor’s
traumatic event as a signiﬁcant element in their group identity, which can become reactivated when
the groups senses a danger from ‘‘others.’’ An example of this is the Israeli-Palestinian case, where
the Holocaust is the chosen trauma for the Jews and al Naqba is the chosen trauma for Palestinians
(Chaitin & Steinberg, 2013).
This has been a common theme in all the accounts I heard from different Yezidis, Yezidis
did not see that the ISIS siege was an abrupt event in history but it was remembered in light of an
acquired identity that presents Yezidis as a historically persecuted group who have endured more
than 70 genocide attempts. Stories of past persecutions are alive in the minds of present day
Yezidis to the extent that most of the tactics the women used during their captivity were passed on
from older generation. This is not a surprise given the importance of oral tradition in Yezidism.
Since no Yezidi owns a copy of the black book, most Yezidis rely on oral tradition in transmitting
knowledge of the Yezidi faith. This transgenerational trauma of 74 separate genocides is alive in
the Yezidi collective memory and remembered in their folklore. One Yezidi song which Yezidis
have commonly recited in the past is a lamentation about the 1837 genocide, when Hafez Pasha
and his troops surrounded Sinjar Mountain. In this song the name of Hafiz Pasha was introduced
at the end of each verse and it became habitual that women would gather at night and recite this
song to remind themselves of the past (Otten, 2017).
This transferrable nature of trauma from one generation to the next elicits an important
question, should we remember the atrocities of the past or should we forget them? In his
controversial work “In praise of Forgetting”, David Rieff (2016) raises a very sobering question
of what exactly is gained-and lost-by remembering. Has the conventional wisdom of those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it helped in preventing atrocities from
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happening? Rieff suggests that remembering may actually cause injustice to the present much the
same way that forgetting does to the past, arguing that in some occasions when collective memory
condemns people to feel the historic wounds of their ethnic groups, it is not the duty to remember
that should be honored but rather the duty to forget (Rieff, 2016). While it is true that in many
ways collective memory has resulted in societies being both unforgiving and unforgiven, yet
forgetting cannot happen until healing does and this may take several generations or else we may
fall into the pit of denial. Stanley Cohen (2001) explains that historical memories about suffering
in distant places are prone to thorough and speedy deletion through the politics of ethnic amnesia.
This happens when people or governments are presented with information that is too disturbing
and threatening to be fully absorbed which results in the information being repressed, reinterpreted
or pushed aside. The repressed pain according to Cohen is never really forgotten it remains
somewhere in there and the terrible outcome of repression is repetition and leakage. As much as
we try to repress , the repressed will sooner or later pay an unwelcomed visit .This is what it means
that the past keeps coming back to haunt you (Cohen, 2001). The most obvious example of a stateorganized attempt to conceal atrocity is the eighty years of denial of the Armenian genocide by
Turkey, in which Turkey succeeded in coercing the U.S and other governments to support the
denial until the fiftieth anniversary of the atrocity when a new generation of Armenians began to
break the silence and reclaim their history (Cohen, 2001).
It is rather a more pressing need to remember when dealing with Iraq, a country where
persecution and oppression have often gone unnoticed. The Anfal campaign against the Kurds, or
as Lemarchand (2011) calls it “the forgotten genocide” of the Kurds is hardly remembered
anywhere outside the borders of Kurdistan, partly due to the U.S effort at the time to silence the
event which came at the peak of the Iran-Iraq war, a time when Saddam was an important ally for
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the U.S (Lemarchand, 2011). The history of oppression and silencing that Iraqi minorities have
gone through presents a stronger case of the need to give voice to Yezidis, a minority group most
of the world has not heard of before 2014.
It is interesting to note that despite this identity of a historically persecuted people group,
most Yezidis have expressed that they all “lived in peace” before the events and they all referred
to the years prior to the genocide in collective rather than individualistic. Hayat, Sahar, Gulee and
Anhar have used terms like “we were living quietly”, “we were living a simple but happy life.”,
“and We Yezidis were very naïve”, “there were no problems before that”. All the women viewed
the years prior to the events in more positive terms, Sabah recalls that they were living happily
“until ISIS came”, even Sahar who was devastated by her father’s death still viewed the days back
in Sinjar as more peaceful and better, similarly Hayat who have repeatedly emphasized that she
lost most of the men in her family during the civil strife of 2006-2007 still viewed the days prior
to ISIS in more positive terms. This tendency to view the years prior to the siege in more positive
terms goes in accordance with many of the literature written about Genocide. Brehm and Fox
(2016) in their study of the Rwandan genocide found that all survivors have referred to the years
prior to 1994 in more positive language. Consequently, this leads to a clear divide in time into
distinct eras, the pre and the Post genocide (Brehm & Fox 2016). This tendency reveals the extent
to which people’s lives have been damaged and irreversibly altered as a result of the events leading
to a nostalgic view of the past as better and more peaceful. August, 3, 2014, has become this
dividing line between the pre and the post genocide eras.
Rise and Fall: The Fall of Sinjar and the Rise of the Islamic Caliphate
The accounts that those women give do not just provide information on how they survived
the siege on a personal level but they also shed light on how sectarian politics are put to action on
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a much larger scale. Hayat’s account offers insight on the dynamics between Yezidis, the Kurdish
government and ISIS prior to the siege, but more importantly it reveals the intentionality of ISIS
to eradicate this people group solely on the basis of religion.
For Hayat, August, 3, was a day like any other day. It was around noon and she was getting
ready to leave home heading to her afternoon shift in the hospital. There were rumors going on for
over a month that ISIS are going to attack, but she has not given ear to any of that because they
were under the protection of Kurdish fighters and she felt confident about the promises of the
Kurdish government. This time it was different.
I could hear a lot of noise outside as the neighbors started packing making their way out
of Sinjar, but I was still reluctant to believe. I was getting dressed ready to go to work but
I thought to call my brother (this could also refer to a cousin) first to check. He too was on
his way to work and was unsure about what was happening, but as he drove out of our
village, the rumors were now confirmed. It was clearly a conspiracy, a plot against Yezidis.
They starting by destroying our place of worship, and then they blew Shiite mosques and
memorials. Even when we tried to flee we were told that there was nothing going on and
we were told to go back home which is why it was clearly a conspiracy. It was hard for us
to believe at first because we were under the protection of Kurdish fighters and for months,
Kurdish fighters and ISIS men were regularly participating in religious rituals together
and praying together in the same mosques, so we did not ever think that in one day things
will turn upside down and they will start fighting. Those who had cars were able to move
out of Sinjar but I did not. We had to walk all the way to the mountain and hide there but I
never thought we would stay there for two weeks. Never did I think that I would be
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responsible for the survival of my family and others, specially my sister in law who was
shot and bled to death.
It is worth noting that the shock Yezidis experienced is not just because the outbreak of
any war is always shocking, but the shock in this case is due to the fact that Yezidis felt that this
was a conspiracy. The term “betrayal” was used in many accounts and even though most Yezidis
feared speaking about politics or giving any explanation of why they felt betrayed, the language
used suggests that it was the Kurdish government they felt betrayed from. Hayat explains that ISIS
men and Kurdish fighters were praying together for months in the same mosques which points to
the fact that there was some sort of union on the basis of religion. In one day however, things
changed and she goes on to explain that this was a conspiracy against Yezidis because even when
they tried to escape they were told that there was nothing going on. Regardless of whether this
holds some levels of truth or not, it does point to how Yezidis as a minority group perceive
themselves in relation to the larger Islamic majority. Yezidis who are Kurdish in ethnicity but are
not Sunnis believe that they have been betrayed by their protectors, the Kurds, to their Sunni
counterparts. Taking this further, Hayat sheds light on how the Islamic caliphate operates by
explaining that they started by destroying the places of worship which is the exact implementation
of Baghdadi’s and his predecessor, Al-Zarqawi’s philosophy of fighting the enemy within to purify
the Caliphate before fighting the distant enemy. As will be revealed in different accounts unlike
any case of war where an invading army purposefully destroys any infrastructure, ISIS does not
do that they rely on using the existing infrastructure for their governance but it is the places of
worship that they single out for destruction. It is also worth noting that within this genocidal mode
of operation, ISIS has used different strategies with different religious groups based on an
established hierarchy of discrimination. For ISIS, Yezidis, being devil worshippers are the primary
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targets that must be cleansed. Shiites follow, being deviators from Islam must also be severely
punished for their apostasy. In the case of Christians, who are considered the people of the book,
ISIS did not use the same genocidal strategies as explained by many of the Christians I interviewed
during my stay. Abou-Fadi , a bus driver originally from Mosul who has moved to Dohuk with his
family, explains how the homogenization of Mosul was happening gradually and while Christian
possessions were taken they had the choice of running for their lives unlike Yezidis.
You think ISIS is new, everything was changing in Mosul gradually, it did not happen all
at once, there were visible changes happening, we were seeing more women in khemar and
more men with beards, even little girls were getting veiled. They began to take over the city
before they kicked us out. It became very difficult for us to live there just because we looked
different and we stood out from the majority. My daughter is only five years old and she
was always scared, one time she was out but returned back home quickly and hid under
the table. The whole society was changing; they were taking over. She was always in a
state of panic and at first I didn’t want to leave because it was our city but sooner or later
we had to whether we like it or not. They took all Christians to the court and they asked us
either to convert to Islam or to leave Mosul. We all chose to leave but we didn’t know that
we will be thrown out. We were not allowed to go back home and pack or even take
anything with us; they took us and drove us out of the city because our belongings were
now theirs. I came out with my family and my mobile, nothing else, no money, no jewelry
no clothes except what we were wearing…. nothing.
Although Christians have suffered greatly; most have lost all their possessions and were now living
in refugee camps or in deserted buildings in the city, there still is a clear distinction between the
status of Christians and that of Yezidis who are treated as war booty. This distinction becomes
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clear in the account given by Alfred of his miraculous rescue from death. Alfred who was
originally from Mosul is now living together with his brother’s family in Camp Sharia. This camp
hosts Christians, Shiites and Yezidis who have come from different parts of Iraq. Alfred asserts
that it is Christ who saved him from a near death experience at the hands of ISIS.
I was in the famous bus incident where hundreds of Yezidis were killed. I took the bus to
go to work but we were suddenly forced to stop. Militants came out of a vehicle and jumped
on the bus to check our IDs. One of them after checking my ID and making a comment that
I was Christian commanded me to immediately step out of the bus and I obeyed without
thinking of the consequences. As I ran for my life all I could hear is the sound of shooting
and as I looked behind me the bus was covered in blood. All the Yezidis inside were
immediately killed for no reason other than religion. I was saved not because of anything
but because I was the only Christian in the bus.
Both accounts reveal the extent to which ISIS has intentionally targeted Yezidis, while Christians
were given the option of running for their lives, Yezidis did not even have this choice to make.
Those that managed to escape had to make this choice in the worse conditions not knowing what
to expect.
Farewell Sinjar
It is hard to imagine what it means to try to escape war on foot or the level of horror that
Yezidis have experienced as they raced against time trying to get to the mountain when they were
surrounded from all sides. For all the ladies interviewed in this research except Anhar, fleeing was
on foot, some managed to escape and others were caught and those who managed to escape had to
survive extremely difficult conditions the least of which is that they had to run without their shoes
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on as will be revealed in Sahar’s account. For Sahar, the process of fleeing and escaping was an
extremely traumatic experience that could have meant the loss of her mother who was shot and
severely wounded.
It was around noon when we knew they had captured Sinjar. I ran to the mountain with my
mother and younger brother and joined my aunt Hayat and my grandfather on the way. I
was extremely terrified when I heard the news that I just ran without even putting my shoes
on. People were running in terror trying to make it to the mountain, but it was a long and
weary journey and we were soon surrounded by vehicles from all sides. I tried to stay close
to my family but it was just difficult to stay together as fire broke lose. Men were pushing,
women screaming and children falling to the ground. In a split of a second I looked around
and I could not see my mother, I looked to the ground and there she was drenched in blood
as my aunt Hayat dragged her all the way to the mountain. I did not believe that this was
happening. There was nothing as painful as losing my father but now I was also losing my
mother. I looked at her as she lay on the ground, trembling and screaming in pain and I
just wished that I would to die; I wished I was the one shot. I took my brother in my arms
and we both cried.
“Sophie’s choice” is a famous saying that goes back to a famous novel and a film adaptation of
the same name centered on Sophie; a mother of two children who has just arrived in Auschwitz
and is forced to make a choice between two unbearable options whether to give up her son or
daughter to the Nazis because only one of them can stay. In times of war and genocide people are
faced with situations where they have to constantly make such agonizing choices. All the
interlocutors were equally faced with such decisions at one point or another. Sahar and Hayat could
have left Sahar’s wounded mother as she bled to death but they chose to carry her to the mountain.
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In the case of Anhar, both Anhar and her sister were faced with a serious decision of whether to
leave their ill mother and run for their lives or stay with their mother and die together.
We didn’t believe that they were going to take over Shingal, we thought it was just a threat.
There were Muslims living in the city, not so many but they were living with us and we
never thought that ISIS will attack. On the day of the siege, people were frightened and
started running away. Some went to the mountain and others who had cars and managed
to flee early on went as far away as they could. We stayed! We couldn’t move anywhere
because our mother was bedridden and unable to move. My mother begged us to go with
the rest and leave her in the house but my sister and I decided that we’d better stay and die
together than to leave our mother. It was a difficult moment, we knew that if we left our
mother she was going to die alone, either because of her state of health or they were going
to find her in the house and kill her. Our only option was to hide in our house, the maids
left and the houses around us from every side were empty but there was no way out for us.
We just had to stay and hide, pretending that the house is deserted and we remained hiding
for 10 days.
Capture: Sorting and categorizing
The accounts given by Hayat, Sahar and Anhar all provide insight on how different Yezidis
survived the siege and fall of Sinjar; there are those who escaped and there are those who remained
behind. There remains however, a significant group who have neither escaped nor remained but
were captured and lived under the rule of the Islamic state. Gulee, the youngest of all the
interlocutors describes her experience of how she got captured on that day.
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I had just turned eleven a few weeks before our village was taken. We all ran to the
mountain when we knew that the Dawa’esh attacked but it was already too late they were
surrounding us from every side. On the way, my friend and I were lost from our families
and so we stayed close to a group of women but we were all eventually taken by the
militants. There were lots of women of all ages, and girls even younger than we were.
Young boys were also taken along with their mothers because they were to be trained to
fight with the Dawaesh. Even those women, who were married, were taken from their
husbands. My friend and I could not stop crying; we did not know if our parents were still
alive or not or if we will ever see them again. We were all horrified but we could not even
react we were dragged like sheep to a school and we remained standing there for hours. It
was too crowded that I gripped my friend’s hand firmly because we were both afraid we
would lose each other.
Gulee’s account demonstrates that it was not only the women and girls who were the
interest of ISIS but also young boys too. During one of the times I was participating in a
clinic in camp Shariah I met a woman who brought her six year old son complaining that
he has a mental illness when asked about details of the child’s situation she explained that
he had spent a year and a half in a training camp and since his release they can no longer
control his aggression. His aggression was directed towards his family whom he started
calling them infidels and one point tried to kill his younger brother. The boy had already
been trained to chop off body parts and he was becoming a serious threat to his entire
family. In writing about violence in South Africa, Arthur Kleinman explain how during
Apartheid the definition of what it is to be a child is forcefully shaped by the experience of
the ongoing violence in which children have played major roles. Families were singled out
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for destruction which often meant that young boys were being forced to fight their fathers
which caused a breaking in intergenerational connections (Das, Klienman, Ramphele
,&Reynolds, 2000). Although, it was still early to see how those young Yezidi boys trained
to kill their own people could have an effect on intergenerational connection but the
violence demonstrated by the young boys returning from ISIS is a source of alarm.
Besides being taken for military training, boys were also taken to be sold to those
with pedophilic tendencies and this was something that Sabah was constantly trying to save
her toddler from.
It was 9:00 am when my husband and I heard the news that ISIS were taking over Yezidi
villages. The roads were blocked so we could not drive out of the village. We rushed to the
mountain, but on the way we were trapped. I suddenly found two vehicles before me and
armed men came out pulling us like sheep. I begged them to let me go because I had
children but they ended up taking my children as well. We were kept in a government
building in the city where they kept us in custody for two days. They began separating the
men from the women, and then separated the young unmarried girls from the rest of the
females. This was the most horrifying day in my life, they saw that I was carrying Rashid,
he was much younger then and because the boy is so beautiful they wanted to take him
from me. Those dogs have no religion; they don’t only want the women but the children
too, some children were taken to the training camp and others were taken for other
reasons…they like children, and as you can see Rashid is blond and his eyes are hazel. We
tried to hide Rashid in blankets, if I saw one of those dogs approaching I would give Rashid
to one of the women who kept him covered in a blanket until they passed.
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Sabah’s account provides a lot of information on how the Islamic state sorts and classifies its war
booties. We understand from Sabah’s account that enslavement did not only affect women but it
was about destroying the entire family, even though it was women who suffered the most. Sabah
explains that there were men, women and children taken and there was a clear process of sorting
and categorizing involved. Men are divided from women and among the women there is further
classification and sorting based on age, virginity and beauty.
The narratives above give us a picture of what the first phase of the genocide was like
which included attacking Sinjar and taking captives. The next chapter covers the second phase of
the genocide which is the survival phase. If the first phase was a shocking and terrifying experience
for all the women, the second phase was a gloomy, unchanging harsh reality as each woman
struggled for survival amidst constant threats until they managed to escape and reach a safe place.
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Chapter 5
The struggle for survival
Each woman faced different circumstances between the fall of Sinjar and their eventual
release but for all of them survival was a daily struggle. There were those who were trapped in the
mountain as in the case of Hayat and Sahar. There is Anhar who had to remain hiding in her house
in the midst of a raging war and there are those who had to endure slavery under ISIS as in the
case of Gulee and Sabah. For all the ladies, survival was not only about preserving oneself but also
involved other family members too. This included every aspect of survival ranging from finding
basic needs like food and water, hours of walking, fighting death and injuries, enduring slavery
and minimizing their chances of being raped. In this chapter I will look at how those women
managed to survive all the challenges they faced until they eventually managed to escape.
A safe haven
To many Yezidis, Mount Sinjar is a significant culture and historical symbol of Yezidism.
The mountain has acted as a safe haven during many of the past genocides and has been equally
crucial for the survival of Yezidis in the events of 2014. It is not an understatement when Yezidis
say that they would not have survived if it wasn’t for Mount Sinjar. The fact that they knew their
way through the mountain meant that they could buy themselves time and hide there out of the
reach of ISIS militants who did not know the mountain as well as they did. In the story of Hayat
and Sahar, Mount Sinjar becomes the safe haven where they spend two weeks until the Peshmerga
clears the way and they manage to escape. This is the account that Hayat gives of the time she spent
in the mountain:
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We remained hiding in the mountain for thirteen days and during that time we saw death
every single day. People were dying in front of our eyes. But I knew that if we managed to
survive this long without eating or drinking then certainly we were going to make it. We
only had one bottle of water and each of us would just take a sip and pass it on to the
person next to them until we consumed all the water we had. We then started to remove
rocks from the mountain and lick the residue of water that was stored after seasons of rain
just to keep ourselves hydrated. For dinner, one of the men would catch a straying lamb
and we would all share our food together. I had to think of ways to ensure that my family
was going to be well. My father was already ill and being in the mountain for this long was
a threat to his health and my sister in law was also in a very critical state, I had to take
care of them all.
Survival did not only mean food and water or enduring the harsh mountain conditions but for
Hayat survival entailed rescuing lives of those who were injured by ISIS during the siege. Hayat’s
sister in-law(Sahar’s mother) was shot in her back and hip during the escape and for two weeks
Hayat had to nurse her until they managed to escape to Syria when the Kurdish fighters opened
the way, and from Syria they took her to a hospital in Erbil.
They started shooting us when we tried to escape to the mountain. My father saw her
covered in blood and he did not have any hope that she could make it but I dragged her to
a safe haven. All that I was able to find is a pain killer and a Voltaren injection, so I quickly
covered the wound, pressing hard on the layers of cloth to control the blood flow. I was
able to control the bleeding and for two weeks I had to look after her in such conditions. I
carried her all the way through to Syria on my back and I did not even have shoes on.
When we arrived to the hospital, the Doctors were amazed to hear what happened. She
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stayed in the hospital for 12 days, the surgeon could not perform an operation because this
had to be done immediately after she was shot but she had to stay there and recover
gradually. It was not only my sister in law that I helped, there was a man almost dying
from dehydration, his wife and two children were losing hope and I only had very little
water left but I gave him all that we had and I did the necessary first aid steps.
The journey Hayat makes from Mount Sinjar to Rojava in Syria, which was the exit road that the
Peshmerga and American forces opened for Yezidis, is 113 hours of walking. Needless to mention
that she was carrying Sahar’s injured mother during this journey until they reached a hospital in
Syria and from Syria they made their way to Kurdistan, after her sister in law received some
treatment.

Hayat’s sister in law was not the only person that she managed to rescue but there were other
stories of people who managed to survive with the help of Hayat.
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God gave me strength and courage to face the situation and help others during the time we
spent hiding in the mountain. My father keeps telling me that they would not have survived
if I was not there. Since the events of Sinjar, I decided to give my life to helping others. I
want to be a bridge to help people cross from their hardships to a better life. I know that I
could choose to live for myself but later on I will surely regret this because I would be
dying twice; a natural death and a moral death if others were not receiving help. Now, I
know that even if I perish, there are many others who will survive because I have enabled
them.
The courage and heroism that Hayat felt during the days in the mountain carry a different reality
to what her niece Sahar felt about those days they hid in the mountain. For Sahar, who broke in
tears as she remembered her mother bleeding for 10 hours, those days were filled with horror and
hopelessness.
I watched my mother wrestle with death. We stayed in the mountain for 2 weeks. It was
extremely scary at night, I could barely sleep from fear and just the idea that we were out
there with no shelter was frightening but I was also scared to lose my mother. I did not
want to close my eyes in case she needed anything. As days went by my mother started to
improve but her wound was too deep she was unable to move. It seemed as though we were
going to live hiding in the mountain forever, I could not even think that there could be a
way out. For days I did not move from my place, I could not eat or drink or sleep or talk
to anyone. I was almost idle. I can’t even remember how the days passed.
In the case of Anhar who remained hiding in her house for 10 days, fear was a constant reality as
they expected death to visit them every single day.
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For ten days we locked ourselves in our house. We lived every day in fear waiting for them
to attack at any minute. We patiently waited for death. We knew that they broke into many
houses and stole people’s possessions because it was now their legitimate right, and we
just waited for our turn to come specially that our house was big and fancy. During those
10 days we didn’t turn the lights or use any electrical devices. We didn’t even turn the taps
on, to make sure no one would hear the sound of water running and we didn’t even cook
so that the smell wouldn’t reach them. We even could not talk to each other because it felt
as if they were hiding behind the walls waiting to hear any sound to attack. Our movement
inside the house was on the whole very limited not necessarily out of caution but we were
almost paralyzed in fear. The fact that we did not know what was going on in the outside
world made us even more scared. We did not even know if there were even any Yezidis left.
Living as a Slave
For all my interlocutors and many other Yezidis who remained hiding in the mountain, or
in the case of Anhar who was locked in the house for 10 days, time was a very crucial factor. They
did not know how long they were going to remain in their current situation or if there will ever be
a way out. The situation however, was much worse for those in captivity; they had already lost
track of time. Gulee who was only eleven when she was captured says that she knew when she
was released that she had spent a year under ISIS during that time she was mostly locked in a
prison cell in Mosul.
After we were captured, we stayed in the school for a few days, and then we were taken to
another school in Mosul. There we were kept in a place that looked like a prison cell. It
was a dark place, there was only one small window with steel bars and there was a constant
smell of dead, rotten mice. It was abhorrent in the beginning but by time we got used to it.
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My friend and I were always holding hands crying and shivering from fear and there was
no one to calm us down everyone was scared and everyone was struggling. We spent a few
weeks in the prison cell during which we almost starved to death. Food and water were
given in very limited quantities that were just enough to keep us from dying. We got each
a piece of Samoon bread once a day with nothing else at all. We were constantly
humiliated…they swore at us, hit us for no reason. At times, they would suddenly come in
the middle of the night and immediately we would all jump off, shrinking back to the
corners of the wall. They enjoyed seeing us frightened and they would ridicule us even
more when they saw that we were scared. After the time I spent in this place in Mosul I was
taken back with my friends and others to a house in Sinjar. This was a large house owned
by a Sunni Amir called Abu- Hamed. There we were kept in a basement that was also like
a prison in terrible condition.
While we know from Hayat’s account that the first thing ISIS did was to destroy the places of
worship, what we see in Gulee’s account is that ISIS relied on existing infrastructure for their
governance. This is contrary to any war where an invading army purposefully destroys enemy’s
infrastructure, ISIS does not do that they rely on using the existing infrastructure but it is only the
places of worship that they single out for destruction. This again proves the genocidal ideology of
the Islamic caliphate that aims at eradicating Yezidis. Like Gulee, Sabah’s account shows how the
captives are constantly being moved between state owned infrastructures; this includes
government buildings, Galaxy hall which is a wedding hall and Badush which is known for the
Badush massacre where over 600 Yezidi prisoners were killed. It is also important to note that
movement was not just between the borders of Iraq, but it was between area under the control of
the Islamic state which includes both Iraq and Syria.
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After they separated us from our families, we were taken to a government building where
we spent some time, then I was taken along with other women to another building where
we stayed for six days…this was a main building (da2era tabe’a ela Kurdistan). We were
then moved to Badush prison in the village of Tel a’far. We did not stay in one place for
the entire time, we spent four months in a school and then we were taken to Mosul where
we stayed in Galaxy Hall. This was the time when they started categorizing and selling the
girls. There were a lot of people inside Galaxy Hall, they were Yezidis who came from
different places in Sinjar and Mosul. One night, the guards came in and they took many of
the young girls, leaving behind the older women. We were taken to Rekka in Syria. In Rekka
we were taken to an underground cell but I haven’t seen anything as horrible as that in my
life. The place was covered in dirty water and sewage that two girls died from skin and
breathing problems. I tried to press on and keep my children away from the jumping rats
at night. The children were collapsing at this stage. Ali started having sudden spells of
anger that stayed with him and Amira lost her ability to speak. We did not stay for long in
the prison cell, we were then moved to another house also in Syria, in much better
conditions, but this was the final round. They made us stand in one line and took several
pictures with different pauses of each woman and wrote some information next to the
pictures. Each day was a countdown; they took ten girls a day. My friend Sarah had several
nervous breakdowns seeing that we were getting lesser by the day.
One of the important strategies that ISIS used to practice their hegemony over Yezidis was in the
form of a constant attempt to convert them to Islam. This obviously was through rape which in
many cases was preceded by prayer according to many survivors’ testimonies, but it also came in
the form of forcing women to learn the Qur’an. This is one of the reasons why many of the ladies
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refuse to communicate in Arabic because it is the language of the oppressor and the language they
need to learn the Qur’an. It is also worth mentioning that pretending not to speak in Arabic was
also a strategy used by the women so that they can understand what the guards are saying. Daniel
(1996) explains a similar experience during the Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri-Lanka where
linguistic identity gained special prominence such that one group defined themselves against the
other based on language to the extent that proving the inability of language was important to sustain
an imagined community.
They insisted on teaching us the Qur’an and made us memorize parts of it by force.
I refused to do so by pretending that I can’t speak Arabic. Most of us pretended
that we cannot speak Arabic even those of us who mastered the language because
it meant that the guards can speak freely and it was a useful way for us to gather
any type of information.
The commodification of the female body
After attacking a village, [ISIS] splits women from men. . . [G]irls are stripped naked, tested for
virginity and examined for breast size and prettiness. The youngest, and those considered the
prettiest virgins fetch higher prices and are sent to Raqqa, the IS stronghold. There is a hierarchy:
sheikhs get first choice, then emirs, then fighters . . .We heard about one girl who was traded 22
times, and another, who had escaped, told us that the sheikh who had captured her wrote his
name on the back of her hand to show that she was his “property.” (Welch, 2017)

With an estimated figure of 5,000 women enslaved, the Islamic state has managed to create
a sophisticated trafficking system with a publicly open market. From the point of capture to sale,
each girl is given the title of “sabaya” followed by her first name. The victim passes through a
typical routine of being photographed and numbered to facilitate the purchase process. Victims
end up being sold to other brokers, wealthy men or are given as a reward to fighters. The trafficking
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system of ISIS provides a clear example of the intersection between sex and war economy. Not
only are the fighters in need of “sex” to fight, but as a matter of fact this established trafficking
system has brought back great revenue for the Islamic state, becoming the crime of choice for the
funding of terrorism (Welch, 2017).
A significant aspect of survival for all the women was to protect their bodies from sexual
assault. It was easier for them to die than to be raped because it was an issue of shame and honor
not just for themselves but for their families and community as a whole. For Yezidi girls, the
calamity was not only because of rape and abduction but mixing with non-Yezidis is prohibited in
Yezidi culture. Yezidis believe that they are descendants of Adam and deny any link to eve which
means that intermarriage with non-Yezidis is prohibited in Yezidi culture and conversion is also
not possible (Lamani & Momani, 2010). The return of thousands of raped girls is therefore not
only shameful and destructive but it is also a deviance from the group’s identity. Das (2007)
provides a similar example in her experience with Indian women who have experienced rape and
abduction during the partition and were also seen to be violating norms and tradition. Those women
used the metaphor of their experience being like drinking poison and keeping this poison within
(Das, 2007). For these women as well as Yezidis, their bodies were carriers of poison that must be
hidden from the public eye to avoid shame and scrutiny.
During the first interview I had with Hayat, she introduced herself by saying “we went
through rape, suffering and humiliation.” It is worth noting that Hayat was not enslaved and
therefore did not experience any kind of sexual assault at the hands of ISIS but rape had become a
significant aspect of the community’s shared suffering that she internalized it as her own. For
Hayat and Sahar the issue of rape was extremely important that they both dedicated their lives to
help girls who have returned from ISIS, particularly raped victims. Similarly, Anhar always felt
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that she could have been in those girls’ shoes which prompted her to work in an organization that
helps survivors. Because of the nature of her work, Anhar knew well how the trauma of rape can
be destructive.
In the excerpt below Gulee explains what ISIS did to some of the girls and she proudly repeated
at various points that she was not raped and that gave her a sense of dignity and victory as if it was
something within her control.
Every few days, guards came in and chose a few girls. Those girls would either be sold in
the slave market or would be given as a reward for fighters. They started by taking the
beautiful virgins, some of them were sold and never seen again but others returned back
to the cell; those were raped by the guards and at times it involved gang rape. It was more
like a form of entertainment to the guards, especially when they gathered around to play
at night. Those girls came back broken and tormented. It was much easier if they did not
come back at all, but I still remember the look on their faces, feeling sick and vomiting
repeatedly, urinating constantly, pulling streaks of hair off their head and bumping their
heads to the wall. We all tried to comfort each other; there were many things that I did not
know in life until I was there. They then started selling away some of the married women.
My friend and I were lucky that they did not touch us (sexually), No one touched me. Maybe
because we were too young and there were plenty of beautiful young women, but they hit
us badly… it was pure humiliation… I was willing to tolerate any condition as long as they
did not touch me (sexually)” “I was told all kinds of names and we were beaten at times
with whips and we were treated as slaves to the extent that when one of the guards wanted
to take his shoes off he called me to do so for him. I was just a slave.
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Gulee broke into tears as she recalled the humiliation she saw under ISIS, but there was still
however a clear distinction between sexual humiliation and other forms of physical but non-sexual
humiliation. Anything was tolerable as long as it was not sexual. Gulee makes it clear that it was
better for the raped girls not to return than to live with their shame. This clear distinction between
sexual and non-sexual violence is due to the fact that rape and sexual assaults are usually regarded
as different from physical aggression. In the minds of the interlocutors and in a closed Middle
Eastern society as such, rape is usually associated with unlawful sex and the taboo of a girl losing
her virginity, but it is not associated with violence and aggression in the same way that beating is.
In this sense a victim of rape does not receive the same empathy that a victim of physical but nonsexual abuse receives.
I knew from Sabah that she was not raped but having endured the hardships of ISIS which
also included various forms of physical and sexual humiliation, she felt great sympathy towards
other girls. Sabah was intentional in making Yezidi families accept their raped daughters after their
return. This was one of the main challenges that faced many girls, they did not know if they will
be accepted by their families or not. In some cases the family would not accept the return of their
raped daughter because of the stigma tied to it and they preferred that she died instead. The other
challenge that the return of raped victims created for Yezidi society was that some of the girls were
pregnant and this would create a huge problem for the child’s ethnoreligious identity because one
is either born Yezidi or is not. This means that the child the girl carried cannot stay with the mother.
Milillo (2006) in examining rape as a tactic of war notes that violence towards women is not only
intended to bring shame to the woman and her family but it is part of the larger goal of eliminating
a certain ethnic group. Ethnic cleansing plays on the reproductive roles of women as the carriers
of culture and by harming and shaming those women they are working towards the elimination of
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the social group as a whole, while at the same time impregnating those conquered women with
more superior and “desirable” genetic material (Milillo, 2006).
It is worth noting that most of the strategies that the women used to minimize their chances
of rape are centered on the female body. The aim was to become as sexually repulsive as much as
possible and the uglier you appeared the safer you are. A research done on Sudanese female
survivors reveals that to avert sexual assault induced by the Sudanese government, Sudanese
women used to cover their faces in mud, refused to shower and pretended that they were nursing
mothers (Jok, 2006). Sabah’s account shows that she used the same techniques which she has
learnt from her grandmother to protect her children from falling in the hands of their perpetrators
during the time of their captivity.
At first when we were in Galaxy hall, I bumped into a man I knew from our village. I begged
him to act like we were married so that they will not take me from the kids. I searched for
him every day but it was almost impossible to find him in the crowds, I could only keep
hold of my own children. At the end of those four months they moved a group of us to
another village in (El Khadra’ district) we were locked in a deserted house where there
was no way out. Each week they came in and picked a few of us for sale. I tried to postpone
this as much as I can and the only thing I could do was to look as ugly and filthy as possible
so that they would not take me and the children, I was only trying to buy myself time. I
covered my face in mud, and shaved large areas of my hair and the rest was randomly cut
in an uneven fashion and most of it also covered in dust. I did the same with the children;
I tried to make them look as ugly as possible and shaved large parts of my girl’s hair. I
borrowed a pair of glasses which made me look much older and I also borrowed an
oversized male blazer to hide my body. For a year I did not shower, I could have but I
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wanted to be as repulsive as possible. Every week before they came in to pick a few of us
for sale, I would do the same rituals for myself and the children. I really didn’t care as
long as we were not taken.
The connection between rape and physical appearance was significant for the women even if in
reality rape was just a strategy of war. One survivor, Baran, whom I did not meet but had heard a
lot about and only managed to speak to her on the phone made a clear remark that she was lucky
she was not that beautiful because it meant that she was raped less. Baran, was raped countless
times but she still believes that her lack of beauty was a blessing compared to her best-friend who
was stunning in beauty and was raped so many times that she ended up cutting her wrist. The
importance given to physical beauty and outer appearance was also part of the healing process for
survivors and this becomes clear when Sahar explains why she chose to work in the beauty Salon.
I want to make those girls look and feel beautiful. Those Daesh guys want us because we
are beautiful, it is not about religion or anything but they say Yezidi girls are too beautiful
to be left alone. The result is most of those girls returning from ISIS are in self-hatred they
try to end their lives because they feel so filthy and unworthy
What Sahar said made a lot of sense given the popularity of the beauty salon every Tuesday. There
was a deep longing in the women to look and feel beautiful after the experiences they had lived
that made them feel shameful and unworthy. I was repeatedly advised when meeting victims of
rape to give them gifts like body lotion, hair products or jewelry because they were accustomed to
harming their bodies and they needed to start to develop different behaviors of taking care of their
bodies instead of harming them.
Family: All for one, one for all
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Family is a very significant and scared concept to all Yezidis, be it the immediate or extended
family. It is very common to hear Yezidis refer to their uncles as their fathers and cousins as their
brothers. The significance of family for all the women was a recurring theme that cannot be
avoided. All the women fought for their survival of their families even more than themselves. This
was evident in Anhar’s story who preferred to die than leave her sick mother. Hayat fought for her
family’s survival particularly her old father and her injured sister in law and Sabah used all kinds
of strategies to make sure that her children were safe. What was also significant is that family did
not only mean the nucleus family but during such difficult times, all Yezidis felt that they were
one family and that was a great source of strength that helped them endure their difficult
circumstances. We know that Hayat did not only help her immediate family but she did help
several other Yezidis who were close to death during the days they were hiding in the mountain.
One particular story stood out the most for Hayat, which was the story of a woman going through
labor. Hayat had not met this woman before but she helped her all night long until she delivered a
beautiful baby boy. For Hayat, who was not married and had no children, this story was a sign of
life and a beam of hope that no matter what ISIS tries to do to destroy the community there was a
new generation of Yezidis being born.
For Gulee who was a young child the presence of other women was a great source of
comfort to her and her best-friend, the women treated them as their children and this solidarity
brought hope to the two girls.
We would comfort ourselves at night by telling each other stories until we fell asleep.
Sometimes we played games together at night like rock, paper, scissors, while the rest were
sleeping and we would giggle and pretend like we were sleeping once one of the ladies
wakes up complaining of the noise. All the ladies were kind to us, they had children and
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knew the horror we were in. But, I was hopeful; I had hope that we were going to get freed.
I did not know how or when but I soothed my friend everyday assuring her that this will
not last.
This social cohesion between Yezidis was evident particularly in Sabah’s case. Throughout this
account Sabah thoroughly uses “we” instead of “I” when narrating what happened. The women
comforted each other when they were down, they feared together, laughed together and they
planned together how to get rid of the guard.
Living conditions were horrible, there was very little food and the food we were given was
always rotten, I had to try it out first before giving it to the children. Each night that passed
was a living hell, we could not sleep because we were afraid they would come in the night
and take us, but we tried to arrange ourselves each night so that a few women would stay
awake all night to watch over us while the rest would try to sleep.I encouraged Sarah (one
of the ladies in captivity who became a close friend of Sabah) and gave her hope that we
would not be sold because I had a plan in mind. We never knew what was happening
outside the gates of this house but the constant sound of airplanes hovering and shooting
missiles killing thousands of ISIS men was a sign of hope for us. One day I went to prepare
a cup of sweetened tea for Sarah but as I waited for the water to boil, I was knocked to the
wall; banging my head then bouncing back, and immediately falling to the ground. The
entire house was shaking; a bomb was dropped causing an explosion in a nearby building.
We were all happy because we knew that the war was raging and that we will finally have
someone coming to rescue us. I told the ladies we have to do something and at this point
Saarah and I decided to slaughter the guard and that way we can all escape. My plan was
soon aborted by one of the girls who we discovered was a spy, she was also Yezidi but she
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fell in love with one of the Jihadists who promised to free her and so she gave him a daily
report about what was going on among the women, a quarrel broke out with this girl that
night and I knew I would be punished the next morning but I had to act strong.We were all
a family except for this girl. We all supported one another, cried together and laughed
together, children played with each other. We lived together for a long time and so we all
became a family except for this girl who was just selfish. As much as I hate those memories
but there were also sweet memories in the midst of pain, we used to play all night long as
we drank sweetened tea. Our children also used to play around us. Those nights were
difficult and many women collapsed and wanted to kill themselves, but the company kept
us strong and I had hope that Allah will answer my prayer.
What was certainly remarkable in Sabah’s account is the spy-girl. Sabah clearly states that they
were all family except this girl who fell in love and married a Jihadi. What is significant here is
that this social cohesion was vital for the preservation of the Yezidi identity. This girl who was
originally Yezidi has almost given up her identity by falling in love with and marrying a Jihadi but
the women needed each other to maintain their Yezidi identity vis-a-vis their non-Yezidi enemy.
The story of the spy-girl is very much aligned with a point that Das (2007) makes in relation to
witnessing betrayal during communal riots; violence solidifies group membership at one level, but
also has the capacity to break relationships at another level.
The Escape: buying your way out
In the majority of cases where girls were able to escape it was through a middle-man or what is
known as a “rescuer”. The middle-man had to be a Sunni to be able to freely have access to the
Islamic state but it also meant he received a lot of money. There were different stories of how
enslaved girls were released, in some cases the girls managed to escape on their own while being
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moved to different locations. The most popular escape scenario was via the wealthy Saudi, Sunni
Business-man who paid ISIS a huge amount of money for the release of many girls who were sent
back to their families. Sometimes, families were able to buy their daughters directly from ISIS
when they were sold on the internet but not many Yezidis could afford to do so and those who had
several girls in captivity could not borrow such huge amounts of money but it must be noted that
a lot of times ISIS contacted the families of the girls when they wanted to get rid of them. I did
witness one case where a slave victim was put on sale and ISIS contacted her family on face-book
but at the time they wanted a thousand dollars for her release which the family could not afford.
In the case of the five women, a middle-man was used to free Alhna, Sabah and Gulee. Sahar and
Hayat escaped on foot when the army opened the way from the mountain to Syria. It is worth noting

that although Anhar was not held captive, the fact that they remained in Sinjar which was now
under the Islamic state meant that they needed a rescuer to take them out.
Anhar describes the details of how she, her mother and her sister managed to escape out of Sinjar
after ten days of hiding in their house.
During those days I was in close communication with my brother in Germany. My brother
was working hard on finding a paid smuggler who could take us out of the city, but we
waited not knowing if this will happen or not. We thanked God each day that passed but
we were expecting the worse each day that followed. I was never a religious girl and I still
don’t consider myself religious, but I feel very grateful that the three of us survived. We
knew from our brother that there was no one left in Sinjar, they were either killed or had
escaped. Finally, after ten days had passed our brother called and he had news that
someone will come to take us out. We waited all night for this person to arrive. It was at
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3:00 am when he finally came. He was a Sunni from Erbil and my brother had paid him
enough money to make sure that he will take us out of Shingal and not sell us to ISIS or to
a second broker. Each of us wore a niqab and covered herself from head to toe so that we
would look like Muslim women of the caliphate. We had to throw away our Identity Cards
so that if they stop us in the checkpoints there would be no proof that we were Yezidi. We
also spoke Arabic very well which meant that we could easily pass as Arabs. Only the
rescuer had to keep his ID, which clearly showed that he was Sunni. Driving out of the city
was not an easy task. The city was completely desolate, there was nothing left from what
we knew was Sinjar. There were rivers of blood and corpses everywhere; those who were
found hiding or injured were immediately killed. It looked like it was the end of the world.
The plants were dead, there were no people left, and houses were destroyed or taken over
by ISIS. As we drove through the city our hearts were torn at the sight of prevailing
destruction and the smell of death that filled the air. At times we had to change routes
because there were a lot of corpses on the ground that we couldn’t make our way through.
My mother broke into tears but we calmed her down because we had to appear composed.
We stopped at three checkpoints, with each stop our hearts trembled. We were asked every
time if we were Muslim and we responded by nodding, but they only checked the driver’s
ID. The driver would explain every time that we were all family, and it was enough for
them to see the ID of the male and verify that he was a Muslim. The first checkpoint was
the most difficult for us because we were just frightened, then the second was more
tolerable, the third checkpoint was a matter of life or death because we were so close to
reaching Dohuk but it could all end in a minute. The moment we stepped out of their
territory we were unable to even react but as we reached Dohuk, the three of us threw
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away the Niqab out of the window and we kept the windows open to inhale some fresh air
which we had been deprived of for so long, we wept hysterically. We couldn’t believe that
we were alive, we just couldn’t believe it.
In Gulee’s story the middle-man happened to be a friend of her brother, whom they knew back in
Sinjar, this middle-man was now working as a mediator between the Islamic state and the local
market.
One time, while the night guards were eating and playing at night, a man had come to join
their company. I was shocked to see that this man was a friend of my brother. He was a
Sunni neighbor living in Sinjar. There were Muslims and Christians in Sinjar not just
Yezidis but most of them had left. I was shocked to see that this man who knew us well and
was a friend of my brother could be related to ISIS. I learnt that he was a middleman who
sold girls to brokers either online or by taking them to local markets mainly in Syria. I
knew that this man could be a source of help but I first had to find a way to speak to my
family and I was able to do so through one of the Yezidi girls who was previously in
captivity but was now married to one of the guards. A week passed and nothing happened.
I assumed that my family did not have enough money to pay, or that the man did not agree
to help them. A few days later, I was taken by one of the guards who dragged me all the
way to another room, I thought that this was my end, but I was put on the phone with a
smuggler who said that will be taking me out. I was going to escape out of the house
wearing a Niqab at midnight and he was going to meet me in a specific location. I did not
know the date or the time, so I had to be ready every night until I was finally set free.
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In Sabah’s story, just when there was hope that they would soon be released as the war on ISIS
escalated and Sabah and the other women had made a plan to kill the guard, their plan was soon
disrupted by a spy-girl who revealed the women’s intention to kill the guard.
The next morning, I was ordered to meet the Wali, two men came and dragged me to his
place. He was A Saudi Wali , his name was Ibrahim EL-Gasrawy, I had never seen a beast
before but he was surely one. He was extremely huge, when he stood up I realized how tall
he was, I only reached his waist and had to raise my head to speak to him, which was
extremely provocative because as a slave girl I was not allowed to look at my master. He
raged and bounced his stick up and down; it was a wooden stick with nails on every side.
I couldn’t look at his face for long not because I was scared but I was disgusted by his
appearance. He had a bold head and had a long, brown-reddish beard that reached his
chest. His wild eyes searched me up and down like a beast would search his prey.
“Give me your money and gold and I will free you”, he said.
“I have no money or gold, we are all women and children and we have nothing.”
“Then we will have you.”
The weight of his spank fell on my face like an avalanche. I couldn’t breathe from the pain
but I insisted on keeping myself strong. I couldn’t feel my body; there is a point in pain
where you can no longer feel. The next thing I remember was that I was lifted up and
thrown to the wall, I could feel the ache of every bone as my body landed on the wall. I
could see the shadow of his monstrous body as he drew closer and closer squeezing my
body to the wall, pressing his body against mine and ripping my shirt in half.
“One day our men will do the same to your women.” I said.
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Wali El-Gasrawy did not remain in the welaya for long; he was soon replaced by a new
Wali, Abu-Mariam. Abu-Mariam was a devout Saudi man, as much as he wanted to bring
back a Muslim caliphate he was not like the others, he did not treat women like slaves and
did not allow any of the guards to beat or harass us. He refused to touch any woman and
more importantly he brought medication, particularly when the children got sick.
During that time, they took us to another house in Rekka, along the way I could see trees
surrounding us from every side it was like a rainforest. Helicopters were raiding ones
again and some women managed to escape but not from the truck I was in. I was too weak
and injured to even move. The rest of us were placed in a prison cell in the basement, we
stayed there for almost six months. One night a fire broke out in the house, we don’t know
what the cause was but it took them a long time until they took us out of the prison. I don’t
recall what happened to me but I recall that I found myself in the hospital and woke up to
find Sarah and another woman as well as my children surrounding me. I immediately took
Rashad from Sarah and embraced my children until we were interrupted by a visitor. AbuMariam came to check on me, I wasn’t surprised by his visit because he was kind to all the
women but I knew that he particularly favored me because I was always bold and dared to
speak up for other women. That day on the hospital bed, I begged him if I could speak to
my family and he agreed.
That night I received another visitor at night, he was a Daeshi but a middleman.
He was one of those militants who agreed to free women for money. He did not say much
but he told me that Seifallah was shot and killed by Kurdish forces and that he will arrange
to have me sent to the “rescuers”. The rescuers were Dawaesh who were willing to send
girls back to their families for a huge amount of money and they negotiated those deals
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through facebook. The man left me a khimar and disappeared but told me to be ready any
minute and told me not to tell any woman or else I and the children will be killed.
I was happy to hear that Seifallah was killed as much as I was happy to know that I will
soon return back to my husband.I put on the Khimar and waited until I was taken from the
hospital at 3:00am. I really did not know what will happen to me or the children but this
was my only hope. They took me to a secret place in an underground hall, it was like those
secret meetings you see in films, with hidden doors that looked like walls surrounding the
area where a few militants stayed all night laughing and chatting and watching video tapes
of women they had kept. They all looked scary; I had never seen men of such sizes in my
life. I was ordered to take off the Khimar so that they could videotape me and send the
video to my husband. After the video-recording I was again threatened that I would be
killed if I told any of the women. They asked a few things about my husband and also asked
for his number.We still had to wait for another month, I did not know what was going on
but I knew that this was a time of negotiation. Each day women and children were being
taken with no return. A new guard came and to my surprise he was a Muslim neighbor I
knew from our village, I begged him not to take Ali because I knew they wanted to train
many young boys to kill and Ali had reached the age where he could be trained to kill. At
the end of the month I and the children were freed, I was told that my husband had agreed
to pay all the money they had asked for and we were ready to go home. It was a difficult
journey back home with lots of fighting between ISIS and Kurdish fighters but we finally
arrived, it was not the home we once lived in but we were back together.
Victim, perpetrator or human
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When hearing any story and particularly that of mass atrocity there is always a strong desire in us
to keep two separate blocks of victims and perpetrators, good and evil, friend or foe. While this
natural inclination to use this binary scheme is justified, it remains a simplification because most
of life happens in what Primo Levi (1986) calls “the gray zone”. This gray zone is not inhabited
with heroes and villains or the drowned and the saved but of human beings like the spy-girl in
Sabah’s account like the change of governors in Sabah’s story from Wali El-Gassrawy to AbuMariam. As hard as it to believe that anything good could come out of ISIS, there was however
one good Wali who did no harm to the women and showed kindness to them. Abu-Mariam was a
strong believer that there needs to be an Islamic caliphate following Shariah law, nevertheless he
did not believe in the rape, humiliation or abuse of women. Those two examples show the diversity
that exists within the Islamic state and how the war project could take different faces. It is much
easier for one to believe that all those who join ISIS are brainwashed, heartless beasts than to think
of the different possibilities that could motivate people to join ISIS. When asked about his
experience with Nazi guards, Primo Levi an Auschwitz survivor explains the following:
“…we are asked by the young who our “torturers” were, of what cloth were they made. The term
torturer alludes to our ex-guardians, the SS, and is in my opinion inappropriate: it brings to mind
twisted individuals, ill born, sadists afflicted by an original flaw. Instead they were made of the
same cloth as we, they were average human beings, averagely intelligent, averagely wicked…they
were not monsters, they had our faces but they had been reared badly. They were for the greater
part diligent followers and functionaries, some fanatically convinced of the Nazi doctrine, many
indifferent, or fearful of punishment or desirous of a good career, or too obedient.
The same is true of ISIS followers, shockingly they were also average human beings made of the
same cloth but diligent followers of a fanatic ideology. The role of the middle-man is also highly
debatable. Where do we position a middle-man in relation to the Islamic State? Are they working
for ISIS? Are they rescuers in the heroic sense? Or are they after money? From the different
conversations I had with different Yezidis, I reached a conclusion that it is difficult to generalize
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the role of the middle-man. In Gulee’s story, we see that Gulee was shocked to find out that her
brother’s friend had joined ISIS but we also know that he acted as a middle-man which also entails
helping Yezidi families reach their daughters in some cases. It becomes clear that in many cases
Middle-men were not following ISIS on the basis of principle but it was a question of money.
Accordingly they served either side depending on which side was willing to pay more which also
meant that they ended up helping many families buy their daughters. This was also true of Levi’s
experience in the Lagers. The networks of human relationships in the lagers were not simple and
could not be reduced to the two blocks of victims and perpetrators, writes Levi (Levi, 1986). This
gray zone was inhabited mostly by victims and collaborators who made certain compromises with
varying degrees of free will in exchange of preferential treatment (Levi, 1986).
This gray zone was also valid for my five interlocutors (and myself) “…the enemy was all
around but also inside” (Levi, 1986). The accounts narrated previously may present an image of
these women being saint-like, but there was a different side of their humanity that may have not
been said in words but shown. That is not to say that they were not victims or that ISIS were not
responsible for the crimes but the truth is that like any human being there were also shades of grey
inside each one of them. Levi breaks this reductionist view of the victim by stating that they all
had stolen from “the other”, they may have done so to curb their hunger but it was theft
nevertheless (levi, 1986). It was almost unimaginable to think that the petite victim Sabah could
think of murder and it may be seen as a justified act of self-defense but it was murder nevertheless.
Hayat was very keen on presenting her case to the world outside but that also came with fulfilling
her own personal ambition and receiving enough support for her N.G.O. Equally, I may have been
moved by the stories of the women and strongly believe in voicing their stories but in doing so, I
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have also used those women to get a story, opened their wounds and used their pain to get a project
done. The point is that the enemy is not just outside but also within.
The fact that each woman managed to escape or buy herself out may seem like a happy
ending to the story. The truth is that this was just the beginning of another story of what it is like
to live as a refugee in the aftermath of the genocide. The difference between fiction and writing
life stories is that in fiction there is always an end to the story, be it happy or sad the fact that the
story comes to a conclusion is in itself a relief, in reality however this is not the case. It is true that
the women no longer have to survive the threat of ISIS but they do have to face new challenges,
challenges that continue until this present day. Reflecting on this aspect, Levi explains that in the
majority of cases, the hour of liberation was neither lighthearted nor joyful because it was often
accompanied by the problems of a life to begin all over again against a tragic background of loss
and suffering. Leaving pain behind was a delight for only a short while for a few people but for
the majority, coming out of the darkness was accompanied by the pain of the reacquired
consciousness of having been demolished(Levi,1986).
The following chapter examines the lives of these women in the aftermath of the genocide.
It should well be noted that the end of genocide also marks the beginning of another difficult phase
of living as a refugee. This phase is not marked by the threat of death and rape but the complexity
of adjusting to new surrounds and reclaiming one’s life while dealing with loss and separation.
The chapter examines the lives of the women though the lens of the refugee problem. The refugee
is often presented as either a threat to security challenging the boundaries of the nation-state or a
traumatized victim in need of intervention, a product of the trauma-focused approach that has
marked our era.
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Epilogue
The Aftermath
Challenges to the Kurdish region
According to a household survey conducted in 2015, an estimated 3,100 Yezidis were
killed during the events of 2014. Nearly half of those killed were executed – either shot, beheaded,
or burned (Cetorelli et al, 2017). The rest died on Mount Sinjar from dehydration, starvation or
injuries during the ISIS siege. The survey results show that while all Yezidis were targeted
regardless of age and sex children were the most affected, constituting 93% of those who died on
Mount Sinjar (Cetorelli et al, 2017). There are no reliable statistics on the number of displaced
persons living in Kurdistan, but the Kurdish regional government claims that 250,000 people fled
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from Syria and two million people have fled from ISIS from other parts of Iraq, including 3000,000
Yazidis and 100,000 Assyrians (Frantzman, 2016).
The current refugee crisis adds a lot of pressure on the region’s infrastructure and economic
stability and has changed the demographics of the Kurdish region, with refugees making as much
as 35percent of the population (Frantzman, 2016). This poses serious challenges on a region that
was attempting to recover from various challenges under Saddam and the post 2003 era. The
majority of the displaced population has not welcomed the idea of returning back to Sinjar.
Although, several families have returned after liberation, the majority still fears the threat of Sunni
extremism choosing to stay in Dohuk (Frantzman, 2016). According to a comparative analysis of
camp and non-camp refugee populations done by the UNHCR in 2015, while 95% of refugees in
camps reported being able to afford the cost of meeting their basic needs, 70 % of refugees living
outside camps are finding it hard to find the necessary resources to cover their basic needs (World
Bank, 2015). Nevertheless, the entire Yezidi displaced population is facing several challenges on
many fronts that have made the need for local and international intervention a necessity.
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During a visit to a family in camp Khanki, the children were happy to receive some toys. None of the
children had shoes to wear for two years.

This young girl survived two weeks in the mountain with her mother. Her father was dead and her brother
experienced a severe trauma that left him unable to communicate with anyone.
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This is what a typical shelter looks like, the covering material makes it difficult to survive the harsh
winter conditions of Kurdistan and the fact that there is no electricity makes it extremely difficult to
survive the summer’s heat.
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This picture taken in camp Be’adra shows how the community is being rebuilt in the aftermath of the
2014 genocide, with different services created by Yezidis to serve other members in the community. The
white tent is a barber shop and the blue one next to it is a photographer and a copy center.

This is both a cafeteria and a grocery store inside one of the camps.
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This picture was taken in Camp Shariah. This type of shelter is usually referred to as a “caravan” and is
owned by the richer Yezidis. The right side of the shelter reads “Shingal- Sinjar 3/8/2014” – the date of
the Siege of Sinjar.

This picture taken in camp Shariah is UN property. The advert on the right calls for the registration of
new born children to guarantee their rights.
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This is an image of a grocery store in Camp Be’adraa, the hand-writing at the top reads “Iraq for Sale”.

The Refugee problem: a threat to security
The most remarkable aspect in the literature on refugees is that more often than not, the
problem is presented not in the political crisis or violence that induced massive displacement of
human beings but rather within the minds and bodies of people who are classified as refugees
(Malkki, 1995). Turner (1967) suggests that” transitional beings are particularly polluting, since
they are neither one thing nor another; or may be both; or neither here nor there; or may even be
nowhere and are at the very least betwixt and between all the recognized fixed points in the spacetime of cultural classification.” The refugee problem is not only interpreted as a problem of
economics or resources but refugees are seen as an issue of security as they blur national
boundaries and challenge distinctions between foreigners and nationals (Malkki,1995).
In the Yezidi situation, while the issue of national security may have affected those who
have sought asylum in other countries, this was not the case with the Yezidis I met in Dohuk as
these are classified as internally displaced. However, for reasons related to how historically
marginalized Yezidis were and the recognition both by themselves and others that they are a
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distinct people group, the differentiation between Yezidi Kurds and Muslim Kurds was present.
The walls of the refugee camp became an embodiment of this distinction from the other,
identifying the difference between a Yezidi and non-Yezidi. Although some Yezidis were not
living in refugee camps, the encampment of the majority of Yezidis was significant in constructing
and reconstructing the identity. As Liisa Malkki (1995) notes in her study of Hutu refugees, the
camp served as the most central place from which to imagine a pure Hutu identity and a historical
trajectory of a nation in exile facing trials and tribulations that would ultimately empower them to
claim the “homeland” in Brundi. The same was true for most Yezidis, the camp became the social
and political space to construct and emphasize the identity of Yezidis as a historically persecuted
group and the rightful inhabitants of Sinjar, the place where Yezidism was founded.
It must be noted however, that the refugee problem is rather a problem of the artificial
construct of the nation-state. The crisis that the refugee creates by disrupting the order of the
nation-state lies in the breaking of the identity between the human and the citizen, nationality and
nativity bringing the concept of sovereignty to crisis (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). Sovereignty is
built on the idea that birth within a particular nation makes the subject a sovereign being, the
refugee on the other hand, no longer shares the sovereignty of the country of origin nor the country
of destination (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). This becomes even more crucial when discussing a
country like Iraq, as revealed in chapter one, sectarian antagonism was introduced by colonial
powers from the moment the nation-state was conceived. The majority of theories on sectarianism
have attributed intercommunal relationships to cultural difference, but seldom has the nation-state
been used as a unit of analysis, although it is the framework within which intercommunal relations
happen. Discourses of modernity refused ancient frameworks that were seen as backward and
irrational and the nation state was proposed as the solution that would bring forth peaceful
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coexistence and would solve economic and political ills (Shihade, 2009). In reality however, this
was far from the truth. This is of crucial importance when discussing the future of Iraq because
rather than assuming that the ills of Iraq are due to the sectarian nature of the country, one must
analyze the contextual factors within the nation-state that fueled sectarian cleavages. Identity, be
it sectarian or any other form of identity is not a fixed, permanent reality but it is constantly
fluctuating and evolving depending on the context (Haddad, 2011). As Fannar Haddad puts it,
terms such as sectarianism or sectarian identity defy formulaic generalizations; contextual factors
such as the sociopolitical and economic conditions at a given time must be first taken into
consideration before making an assumption about sectarian harmony or disunity (Haddad, 2011).
As Volkan (1998) depicts it; most of us are involuntarily unaware of our breathing but only
when we contract ammonia, we suddenly become aware of every breath. When there is a perceived
threat on one’s identity, those layers of economic and political factors may trigger sectarian
sentiments that would otherwise have been dormant. Looking at communal Lebanon, Ussama
Makdisi (2000) explains sectarianism as the product of a series of processes through which
“religious heritage becomes the primary marker of modern political identity”. What brought a
legacy of Sectarianism into existence was neither an upsurge of primordial religious solidarities
nor was it a traditional reaction to efforts of reform, sectarianism was rather actively produced
resulting in an environment of religious differentiation that according to Makdisi didn’t exist
before. The point that Makdisi makes is that if sectarianism is produced it can also be reversed.
What happened in Iraq is that the American invasion of 2003 resulted in is a sharp
deterioration from sectarian coexistence to sectarian violence due to the consistent
institutionalization of identity politics. Sectarian identity, in and of itself, became the explicit cause
of exceeding violence (Haddad, 2013). Minority groups which formed 5% of the total population
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were experiencing significant threats following 2003, where they would comprise more than 20%
of the displaced population in Iraq (Lamani & Momani, 2010). 80% of Mandean and 60% of
Christians were either displaced or were forced to flee. According to the UNHCR, 4.5 million Iraqi
refugees at the beginning of 2008, and 2.3 million and 2.2 million were internally and externally
displaced. This meant that one of every seven Iraqis was likely to be subject to displacement
(Lamani & Momani, 2010). The current refugee crisis therefore is to be seen as a continuation of
deteriorating sectarian relations that started since 2003. That does not mean that sectarianism did
not exist prior to 2003, but what happened since the American invasion is that sectarian identity
has taken a life of its own, becoming unanimously the primary marker of Iraqi politics.
The Refugee problem: traumatized victims
Another important aspect of the refugee problem lies within the political image of the
refugee as a traumatized victim in need of intervention. The twentieth century institutionalized
assistance to refugees for the dual purpose of safeguarding nation-states from the potential threat
of refugees while protecting the increasing number of victims’ subject to violence and persecution
(Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). The idea that war-torn societies are “traumatized” and require
therapeutic management for the community to be able to move forward has gained special attention
since the political tension in South-Africa (Moon,2009). This assumption goes back to the First
World War where the concept of “shell shock” was used to treat soldiers who have experienced
horrific conditions of trench warfare. This was the initial point of recognizing and medicalizing
emotional and psychological reactions to war. After that, came the Vietnam War, which led to the
emergence of the trauma rubric, “posttraumatic stress disorder” (PTSD in relation to a range of
psychological and emotional symptoms that veterans returning from Vietnam experienced. During
the era of the “new wars” of the 1980s and 1990s, this concept of traumatized societies is further
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developed to include entire civilian populations and not just combatants (Moon, 2009). The
ideological revolution that came as a byproduct of the concept of trauma has changed the status of
wounded soldiers, survivors of accidents and individuals hit by misfortune from that of a suspect
as it has always been portrayed at the end of the 19th century, to that of a legitimate victim (Fassin
& Rechtman, 2009). The overlap between trauma and exile became a very significant aspect of
this institutionalized assistance, because trauma became an essential component in the
administration of proof upon which the refugee can receive assistance (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009).
Accordingly, trauma also evolved from being a medical concept to become a political
category. One can say that the genealogy of trauma is therefore dual, not only has trauma evolved
in the medical and psychiatric field but also as a political category, in an anthropological sense, in
terms of how victims are recognized and how journalists, lawyers, humanitarian and support
groups intervene with the traumatized victim (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). However, the problems
of this image of the traumatized refugee are multifold and deserve further scrutiny. On one level,
following Young (1997) it must be noted that the disorder is a historic product that is neither
timeless nor possesses an intrinsic unit but is put together by the practices, technologies and
narratives of various interest groups and organizations that mobilize these efforts (Young, 1997).
The role of medical experts and psychologists has significantly evolved from previously being
care givers to the ones responsible for administering proof and legitimating the refugee experience.
On a different level, although in principal the concept of trauma is seen as universal, the
politicization of trauma reveals discrepancies in the practice of human psychiatry in the treatment
of victims depending on whether they are Kosovars or Serbs, Armenians and Romanians or
Congolese and Liberians (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009). More so, the influx of Iraqi and Syrian
refugees into Turkey reveals how trauma takes a role in the geopolitical maneuvers of war and
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diplomacy (Loyd, Ehrkamp, & Secor, 2017). Turkey has used the moral burden of hosting refugees
as a “bargaining chip” with the European Union, which resulted in the EU committing to a
financial aid of 3 billion Euros for Turkey and Turkey’s temporary accession to the EU despite its
deteriorating human rights record. In exchange of that, Turkey has become the EU’s security
agency engaging in both humanitarian and military interventions across the borders (Loyd,
Ehrkamp, & Secor, 2017).
The fact that the refugee rather than being an individual has been reduced into a victim
category established by medical experts, psychologists and aid workers raises the question of
whether or not the refugee identifies with this political representation. On one end of the spectrum,
victims of trauma may adopt the only persona that supports their claim for justice – that of victim.
In doing so, they are speaking not of who they are but of the moral economies of our age. On the
other end, victims may not see themselves as victims; asylum seekers may relate to themselves as
political activists, and research shows that Palestinian refugees may see themselves as heroes of a
cause rather than victims (Fassin & Rechtman, 2009).
From a psychological perspective, adopting a trauma-focused approach comes with its own
limitations. That is not to undermine or discredit the severity of trauma that refugees have
experienced but to highlight the necessity of a holistic and integrative approach in dealing with
refugees (Isakson, Legerski, & Layne, 2015). A research done in 2015 on the prevalence of PTSD
and depression among Yezidi refugees in Iraq shows that the frequency of PTSD was 42.9% and
the frequency of depression was 39.5% (Tekin et al, 2015). The rate of PTSD and depression in
women refugees was higher than among male refugees. Traumatic events associated with PTSD
were identified as “had been in a region that is affected by war, “witnessed the death of a close
friend or a family member” and “witnessed the abduction or being taken hostage of a close friend
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or a family member” (Tekin et al, 2015). In addition to understanding past traumatic events, it is
also significant to understand current stressors that the refugee may be experiencing that may
significantly affect their psychological conditions (Isakson, Legerski, & Layne, 2015). Examining
a refugee only through the lens of trauma indicators like “had been in a region that is affected by
war, “witnessed the death of a close friend or a family member” and “witnessed the abduction or
being taken hostage of a close friend or a family member” does not take into consideration
important factors that can be affecting the refugee in his present circumstances like displacement,
poverty, language barriers or migration of family members.
A community for women (YAZNA and The Open Space)
Since 2014, many international actors and NGOs, have dedicated their efforts in helping
Yezidis cope with their post-conflict conditions. This does not only include physical needs like
food, clothes and shelter but special attention has been given to their psychological condition.
During my fieldwork, I was working with 2 other NGOs that have focused on providing
psychological help to survivors, besides the initial NGO I was volunteering with that had
established bakeries inside the camps and provided medical supplies as well as other physical
needs.
Despite the striking difference between the 2 NGOs I was collaborating with, they both did
a great job in the healing process of Yezidi women, particularly those who have returned from
captivity. I choose to give pseudonyms to the two NGOs based on the preference of the ladies I
worked with. YAZNA was a much more established NGO, located at the heart of Dohuk city.
There was a clear structure and a clear hierarchy and it was managed by a highly professional
Swedish lady who was in control of the entire workflow. The open Space was certainly more
casual and less structured. It was located inside Camp B’adraa and was run by Hayat- a Yezidi
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who was herself an inhabitant of the camp but Hayat knew the women well and lived among them.
The fact that the 2 NGOs specifically served the female population was remarkable. Women are
certainly less privileged in the community even before the crisis broke out. They had to marry at
a young age; the majority is uneducated and guided by strict rules and traditions.
In a time when many girls had lost their families, were abandoned by them and many were
dealing with severe depression with no job or purpose in life, finding a community to belong to
was significant. Not only did it help break the isolation and sense of loneliness those women were
living in by connecting them to other women in the community, but it also helped them articulate
their feelings and find practical ways to deal with their trauma. The fact that these women
interacted with each other gave them a motive to fight for each other and encouraged them to press
on.
One of the distinctive aspects in The Open Space was the fact that the women were engaged
in sessions that helped them learn new skills and become more productive in society. Many of the
women were learning how to read and write for the first time, others were learning how to saw
clothes and the majority was learning Arabic. The beauty salon was an exceptional feature because
it gave women a chance to do the things that they enjoyed doing but were considered a luxury
given the fact that they were refugees living in a camp and cannot afford the basic things in life.
The fact that the beauty salon was not confined to a room or a covered area was highly empowering
because it meant that these women can do what they like even if people were passing by and
watching them.
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The ladies of Camp B’adraa during a Tuesday gathering in the beauty salon.
Moving on: the importance of religion
How do people and communities move on, after they have survived and continue to survive
such traumatic experiences? The idea of healing post-conflict societies has gained political
credence in the last few decades. Lumsden (1997) argues that in order to break cycles of violence,
postwar social rehabilitation must work on reconciling the “outer world” with the “inner world”
to overcome the impact of trauma. Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana (2005) highlight that
in order to heal, members of victimized groups must engage with their pain, re-experience the
sorrow under safe conditions and must in return receive empathy and support from each other and
also from people outside their group. The authors emphasize the importance of creating processes
that promote healing for the wider society, this includes ceremonies, memorials and testimonials
where people can engage with their experiences and connect with one another in ways that point
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to a more hopeful future rather than reinforce woundedness (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, &
Hagengimana, 2005).
In Man’s Search for Meaning, Victor Frankl sheds light to the importance of finding
meaning in suffering by recounting his own experience as a prisoner in a Nazi concentration camp.
For Frankl, even in the midst of suffering people have the freedom of will to choose who they
become as human beings. Despite all the challenges of living in a concentration camp, Frankl
asserts that it was possible for spiritual life to deepen (Frankl, 1946). For the majority of the
Yezidis I met, faith in God was the key to endure their suffering. God, a greater supreme,
omniscient, sovereign and omnipresent was the source of meaning for them. In Yezidism, there
was no devil or any source of evil, everything was dictated and ordained by God. I was told by
Sahar’s mother that what happened was all God’s will. During a visit to Sahar, I was told by
Sahar’s mother that “In Yezidism good and evil are from God, and that’s why we fear the devil
because he controls life after God, the devil repented after falling and he was forgiven and was
ordained to rule the earth.” Hayat, on the other hand believed that “even God does not accept what
ISIS are doing”. Despite the differing views and varying degrees of piety all the women and all
the Yezidis I met believed in the existence of God. For them, the God of Yezidism was also the
God of Muslims and Christians alike. According to the women, there were different paths called
religions but it all led to one God. Yezidis had great pride in believing that they are the most ancient
people group as descendants of Mesopotamia and so their faith was much older than Christianity,
Judaism and Islam. All the ladies attributed their survival to God who responded to their prayers
because he had written that in their fate. Sabah recounts that she had prayed for one of the guards
to die because she abhorred him and the next day he died during a raid, this was because she knew
that God answered all her prayers since childhood when he saved her from her step-mother. It was
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allah sob7anoh wa ta3ala who saved her and her children. Gulee also recounts that it was God who
made a way for her to escape, “It was only because God wanted me to live and he saw the agony
I was in.” She was so grateful to God that she felt she must pay back by helping out others in her
community and the best way to honor God for saving her was to become a doctor.
Hayat who once made a statement that even God does not accept what is done to Yezidis,
in a different occasion she explained that the siege was a test from God to strengthen her people
who were very naïve. God wanted to make them stronger so he allowed them to go through this
test but this was not to put them into despair but to strengthen them. Hayat believed that God has
placed strength inside every Yezidi and they just had to search within their souls to find this
strength. For Sahar, who like her mum knew that this was all God ordained she found comfort in
knowing that only God knows and sees what Yezidis had to go through and he was the judge who
will avenge and reward them on judgment day. Anhar was not a highly religious and conservative
girl, she believed like all Yezidis that all religions lead to God and she highly valued her friendships
with Muslims and Christians. Recalling her experience, Anhar was clear that it was God who
protected her, her mother and sister and without his protection they would have never made it out
of Sinjar.
What seemed obvious was that suffering was a very spiritual experience that could not be
experienced or fathomed without relating their experience to God. This was not only true for
Yezidi survivors but research on Armenian and Rwandan survivors have also shown that religion
was integral to the experience those survivors lived (Miller&Miller,2004). It is faith that helped
survivors of the Armenian and Rwandan genocide find a purpose in their suffering and it is faith
in God that has helped those women hold on and find meaning in their suffering. Cobban (2007)
examines the significant role religion plays in the healing and reconciliation for post-conflict
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societies. Cobban points to the struggle of South Africans for equality, explaining that the
teachings of Islam, Hinduism and Christianity made distinctive contributions in reinforcing
healing of non-white communities. She notes that, although the majority of liberal-western
governments abstain from the role of religion especially when religion is usually the cause of many
conflicts, case-studies from Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa show the significance of
religious ideas and institutions (Cobban, 2007). The extreme and multi-layered levels of
vulnerabilities that post-conflict societies go through makes the role of religion highly significant
for the process of peacebuilding (Cobban, 2007). This was also true for most Yezidis I met, religion
was important for the role it played in sustaining the individual and holding the community
together. Religion was not taken as a dividing factor between Muslims, Yezidis and Christians but
as a uniting factor that encouraged love and respect for the other.
I did not realize the importance of religion and Spirituality for Yezidis until I visited the
city of Lalish. It is important to note that the Yezidi temple is only found in Sinjar and Lalish
which means that the genocide resulted in a huge spiritual separation from their place of worship.
Visiting Lalish was therefore a dream for every Yezidi I met. I visited Lalish during a trip
organized by Anhar for the ladies receiving help from YAZNA. Accompanying the women in this
spiritual journey was not only a very unique experience for me as an outsider. There were two
particular moments that were the highlight of the trip; the first was when all the women gathered
around the pillars inside the temple and tried to untie the knots. I was told that pilgrims are means
to untie the knots in the cloth to have their prayers answered. It was interesting that for hours these
women did not speak or interact with anyone but as soon as they reached those pillars there was
suddenly a thunder of prayers as they determinedly untied those knots. The silence resumed again
until we reached an inner room in the temple. This was an inner chamber that only Yezidis can
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enter so I watched from a distance. There was a stream of water in this inner chamber, I was told
that if you were praying for the return of a loved one you need to put your feet in the water and
start kicking your feet to have your prayers answered. Once again all the women rushed to the
stream as they prayed for the return of those in captivity. It was a highly emotional and spiritual
moment for the women but all of them expressed how soothing and significant their experience
was.
The use of symbolic resources and in this case piligrimage to Lalish is significant in
sustaining and helping individuals and communities experiencing chaos move through a
transitional phase. In such situations when people lose the common ground, the taken for granted,
they attempt to construct meaning through the use of symbolic elements: “that is, in shared
concrete things, or some socially stabilized patterns of interaction or customs that encapsulate
meanings or experiences for people (Zittoun et al, 2003).

The holy city of Lalish is where the
Yezidi temple is located
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The black serpent, an important
symbol of Yezidi faith found at the
entrance of the temple.
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Inside the temple in Lalish.

As part of the Yezidi prayer rituals, you have to untie those knots to have her prayer answered.
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